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ABSTRACT
Healthcare providers have a responsibility to protect patient’s privacy and a business
motivation to properly secure their assets. These providers encounter barriers to achieving
these objectives and limited academic research has been conducted to examine the causes and
strategies to overcome them. A subset of this demographic, businesses with less than 10
providers, compose a majority 57% of provider organizations in the United States. This
grounded theory study provides exploratory findings, discovering these small healthcare
provider organizations (SHPO) have limited knowledge on information technology (IT) and
information security that results in assumptions and misappropriations of information security
implementation, who is responsible for security, and what the scope of security is to address
organizational cyber risk. A theory conveying the interrelationship among concepts,
illustrating these barriers, is visually communicated. This research can be leveraged by
researchers to further understand the dimensions of the identified barriers and by practitioners
to develop strategies to improve organizational information security for this demographic.
The study’s findings may apply to SHPOs in other states as the criteria of South Carolina
based SHPOs did not seem to influence the findings.
Intensive interviewing was conducted on nine SHPOs in the state of South Carolina to
elicit their thoughts and perspectives on information security at their business, how decisions
are made regarding information security, how threats and risks to their business are perceived,
and to understand financial activities associated with providing information security at their
organization.
The concepts and categories, and how they interrelate to each other compose the
“flashlight in a dark room” theory. This theory claims the current IT and information security
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knowledge of staff responsible for information security at these SHPOs produces a narrow
scope of what is required for proper information security and informs their perceived cyber
risk exposure. These personnel are only “seeing” what the flashlight illuminates in a dark
room full of cyber risk. They are committed to secure their organization appropriately and are
confident in their current cyber security posture. This causes an organizational cyber risk
reality versus perception misalignment, resulting in unknown, accepted risk exposure.
SHPOs support information security and are motivated to be ‘as secure as possible’
with a strong emphasis on protecting their patient’s protected health information. This
suggests if ‘the “overhead light in the dark room” could be turned on, and illuminate the scope
of cyber risk, these organizations would begin to work toward implementing security controls
that align to their actual cyber risk.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Healthcare providers have a responsibility to protect patient’s privacy and a business
motivation to properly secure their assets (Bianchi, 2009; M. Smith, 2017). Despite motivation
and regulation, these organization types struggle with adequate information security (Institute,
2016). Currently, it is not understood what issues and impediments are causing this state of
inadequacy and limited academic research has been done in this specific area (Appari &
Johnson, 2010).
Small healthcare provider organizations (SHPO), healthcare providers with 10 or fewer
practicing physicians, are a subset of healthcare providers. These entities are subject to the same
regulations and threats as large healthcare provider organizations, but with less human resources,
data assets and resources associated with information and system privacy and security.
The following dissertation research project studies South Carolina-based SHPO
information security decision processes from participants involved in these experiences to
understand factors that are defining and driving the state of information security at SHPOs. The
output of this effort was a theory, grounded in data, explaining the phenomena of why SHPOs
struggle with effective information security programs.

Background
Information technology and Internet-access are ubiquitous in the healthcare industry
today, especially with the incentives and motivations of governmental programs encouraging IT
adoption (Jones, Rudin, Perry, & Shekelle, 2014). Threat-actors including insider threats, nationstates, cyber-criminals and competitors can disclose, destroy, modify or make unavailable IT-
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vital assets causing harm to healthcare businesses (Coats, 2017). Information security controls
are the mechanisms organizations can use to mitigate the risk of these threats (NIST, 2004).
Information security controls are designed to meet one or more of the three fundamental
security objectives (Ross, 2013). These objectives are confidentiality, integrity and availability.
Confidentiality ensures only individuals that are authorized to access a resource are allowed.
Availability ensures authorized individuals can access a resource when they want. Integrity
ensures the resources composition is not modified or destroyed in an unauthorized manner.
These control objectives are required for healthcare provider organizations through physical,
administrative and technical controls as defined by the Healthcare Information Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA).
The United States healthcare industry creates, uses, manages and protects sensitive
information. This industry’s data includes protected health information (PHI). The nature of what
an individual discusses with a healthcare provider is personal. Furthermore, privacy of that
information is expected and federally regulated. The information includes sensitive information
such as an individual's medical history, drug use, sexual history, mental health history and
diagnoses (Gostin, Lazzarini, Neslund, & Osterholm, 1996). This list is not exhaustive but
demonstrates the criticality of properly securing the data from unauthorized disclosure while
emphasizing the importance of timely access by authorized individuals.
South Carolina healthcare organizations’ intent to secure systems and protect patient
information is not just a best practice for appropriate business responsibility, but all U.S.
healthcare organizations are regulated by HIPAA. HIPAA includes explicit sections that
document required security and privacy controls. This federal regulation, enforced by the U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services (HHS), mandates business entities that handle PHI are
subject to and must comply with HIPAA.
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Presidential policy directive 21 (PPD-21) establishes the policy for “the United States to
strengthen the security and resilience of its critical infrastructure against both physical and cyber
threats” (House, 2013). HHS is designated as the sector specific agency for Healthcare sector
(DHS, 2017b). HHS is empowered to develop a National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)
healthcare sector-specific plan. Healthcare is identified in as a sector of the U.S’s critical
infrastructure (DHS, 2017a). Direct patient care, encompassing SHPO, is defined in the sectorspecific plan as a private sub-sector within the healthcare sector. The healthcare sector-specific
plan defines goals focused on security and resilience of healthcare systems and services.
South Carolina SHPOs must comply with state regulations in addition to HIPAA federal
regulation. South Carolina state regulations, defined in the Certified Industrial Hygiene and
Certified Safety Profession Title Protection Act ("SC Code of Laws - Title 39 - Chapter 1 General Provisions," 2018), require breach notification. Specifically the law states “a person
conducting business in this State, and owning or licensing computerized data or other data that
includes personal identifying information, shall disclose a breach of the security of the system
following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to a resident of this
State whose personal identifying information that was not rendered unusable through encryption,
redaction, or other methods was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an
unauthorized person when the illegal use of the information has occurred or is reasonably likely
to occur or use of the information creates a material risk of harm to the resident”.
HIPAA requires controls that address security and privacy of information assets. The
Certified Industrial Hygiene and Certified Safety Profession Title Protection Act (2018) requires
response actions in the event of a privacy breach. The guidance for protecting critical
infrastructure focuses on security and resilience of systems. All are important to consider when
making information security decisions for a South Carolina-based SHPO.
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Healthcare organizations utilize technology and operational processes to reduce cyberrisk, the risk of an adverse incident resulting in the compromise of one or more security
objectives for a controlled resource (i.e. breach of a patient data, unavailability of a medical
device), and address HIPAA requirements. Information security technology can include
firewalls, intrusion detection systems and endpoint security applications. Operational processes
can include recurring user account validity reviews, operating system patching and configuration
management.
Small businesses have a high-likelihood of being targeted in a cyber security related
attack. According to Ponemon (Institute, 2017), 54% of small businesses have suffered a data
breach and 61% have suffered a cyber-attack within twelve months of the report. Furthermore,
research conducted in 2016 showed healthcare organizations experience 11.4 cyber-attacks per
year on average, about one every month (Institute, 2016). Victims can experience multiple
impacts from a compromise including financial loss, reputational damage and operational
degradation.
Kane (Kane, 2017) reported through the American Medical Association, in the 2017
annual Policy Research Perspectives, 57.8% of physicians work in practices with 10 or fewer
physicians. Given a majority of healthcare providers are 10 physicians or fewer, this value is
used as a defining factor to qualify the “small” attribute of a SHPO. SHPO is a large population
of healthcare businesses that have a unique intersection of sensitive data, regulations to ensure
security and privacy, a desirable target for cyber-criminals and resource constraints to properly
secure it.
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Problem Statement
Given these challenges and demands small healthcare organizations are subject to,
implementing effective information security controls poses a challenge. 67% of healthcare
organizations self-identify as not having a very effective cybersecurity posture, based on
Ponemon’s (Institute, 2016) research of 535 organizations, where 96% of respondents were from
organizations less than 500 employees.
These organization types should be securing their data assets, yet the majority are not.
There are multiple possibilities that could be the root cause of this state. For example, small
healthcare organizations may not understand how to implement effective security controls, there
may be a lack of resources to allow the implementation of effective security controls or there
may be an intentional decision not to implement effective security controls. The lack of
academic research in the underlying motivations of small healthcare providers information
security program management decision processing leaves a gap in the literature exploring
management’s decision and support impact on overall information security control effectiveness.
The problem addressed by this study is why information security at SHPOs is not very
effective despite external and internal factors that promote the opposite. Focused factors are
associated with the environment and applicable circumstances that shape the culture, decisions
and approach of SHPO’s information security.

Purpose
The research explored South Carolina, small (less than 10 physician practices) healthcare
providers' management perceptions of vulnerability to cyber-attacks and the motivations
influencing their security control implementation decisions they take to safeguard their
organizations.
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The research utilized a Grounded theory research methodology with an interpretivist
worldview. Grounded theory is a methodology pioneered by Glaser and Strauss in the late
1960’s that moved qualitative inquiry from a descriptive study into an explanatory theoretical
framework, allowing for a deeper understanding of the studied phenomena (Charmaz, 2014; B.
G. a. S. Glaser, A.L., 1967).
Grounded theory from a interpretivist worldview enables researchers to inductively
develop a theory or pattern of meaning rather that start with a theory, as in a post positivist
worldview (Creswell, 2014). A theory explaining the process that management at small
healthcare businesses engage to implement, maintain and justify their information security
decisions was contributed to the body of knowledge.

Significance
There is limited literature on information security practices in small businesses despite
the significant footprint they compose within the U.S. economic landscape , specifically 99.7%
of U.S. businesses with paid employees (Advocacy, 2017). SHPOs make up the majority of
healthcare provider organizations in the United States, representing 57.8% of all healthcare
providers (Kane, 2017). Furthermore anecdotal evidence shows a majority of information
security professionals at organizations within the healthcare sector assess the current state of
cybersecurity in healthcare as failing or barely passing (HealthcareInfoSecurity.com, 2017).
The exploratory findings from the research can be used by SHPOs to understand how to
improve the organization’s information security posture and how the organization compares to
other comparable population, geography and demographic healthcare organizations. This
research can inform policy makers at multiple levels (i.e. organizational, local, state, federal) on
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decisions that impact regulation and best practices. It can also be used to inform information
security decisions by leadership at SHPOs.
Grounded theory as an exploratory research methodology is appropriate to understand the
current state of practice, the attitude and culture of these organizations and explains what is
actually happening (McCallin, 2003). An exploratory research approach was appropriate in this
context given this lack of understanding of this topic (Creswell, 2013, 2014). The research
design leveraged the qualitative method of grounded theory to inductively develop a theoretical
understanding of what is happening from an operational perspective within these organizations;
generated from raw data gathered during interviews, memos and other essential methods
required for grounded theory (A. Bryant & Charmaz, 2007).

Nature of Study
Business processes determining information security decisions are specific to individual
organizations and are conducted through social processes (K. G. Smith et al., 1994).
Management makes information security decisions for the organization based on the information
available to address risk and regulations. Qualitative research provides for understanding of
social phenomena, such as this decision process.
A qualitative research design was appropriate for this research area given the limited
research in the area of small healthcare provider business information security, the increased
potential impact of security control failure in the healthcare industry and the subjective factors
that drive decision makers at small healthcare provider organizations.
Grounded theory specifically aligns with this area of research. It supports exploratory
research, relies heavily on the experiences and interpretations of the participants in the setting.
Unique to grounded theory, it allows the researcher to dynamically drive the direction of the
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study as areas of interest present themselves through concurrent data generation and analysis.
This research freedom complements the inductive approach to data analysis. Additionally,
grounded theory supports deductive data analysis, enabling researchers to retrospectively apply
findings, such as a theory, inductively developed on previously executed interviews or memos to
affirm the findings or provide input into tuning it.
Detail on this study’s research design are captured in the following table, attributes are
based on Creswell’s (Creswell, 2014) model for qualitative constructivist proposal format and
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009) “Research Onion” diagram.
A brief value determined for each research design attribute is provided. A complete explanation
for each attribute is in Chapter 3.
Table 1 - Research design properties

EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY
Attribute

Value

Philosophical worldview

Interpretivism / Constructivist

Qualitative design strategy

Grounded theory

Researcher role

Active participant and observer

Approach

Inductive

Choice

Monomethod

Time horizon

Cross-sectional

Data collection

Interview

Data analysis

Concurrent data gathering and analysis;
Thematic coding and abstraction; Grounded
theory systematic analysis methods

Research support software

Atlas.ti qualitative data analysis

Internal validity

Data triangulation

9

Research participants were recruited through canvassing techniques. Additionally, the
principal investigator (PI) engaged with a South Carolina medical association to leverage the
association’s communication channels to promote the study and solicit participants.

Bounding the Study
The following describes the environment that the research was conducted, the types of
participants that were solicited for data inputs and the aspects of the participants experiences that
were under discussion. The sensitivity of the research topic included adherence to federal
regulations, protection of patient information, financial losses and negligence. Each is a sensitive
topic and may dissuade a participant from being forthcoming with complete, honest responses
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(Saunders et al., 2009). Ethical considerations for this type of collected data and the approach to
promoting complete responses are also detailed below and in the data collection subsection.
Setting. The study investigated SHPO and the processes management exercises to make
information security decisions. Interviews were the primary method for data generation.
Saunders (Saunders et al., 2009) provides guidance on conducting interviews to encourage
participation, limit interviewer bias, and promote full responses. Interviews occurred via a
teleconference medium, in accordance with approved Institutional Review Board (IRB)
requirements.
Interviews were overtly audio recorded. Recording could have been omitted from an
interview per research participant request in accordance with the research participant consent. No
participant exercised this option.
Participants. Target research participants were individuals that work within management
or leadership roles in small healthcare provider practices within South Carolina that are
accountable for information security at the SHPO. If a SHPO has more than one individual
accountable for information security, all accountable individuals were interviewed
simultaneously to avoid gaps in responses or conflicting responses from separate interviews.
The constructivist approach to grounded theory places the researcher as a subjective
active participant in data generation with the participant (Birks & Mills, 2015). The raw data
from the participants ground any developed abstraction or theory, but it is the researcher’s
interpretation that constructs these abstractions and theories. Focus remained on understanding
the meaning participants hold about the problem.
Events. This grounded theory study sought to understand processes engaged and
influences into these processes for information security management at SHPO, specifically
explicit activities involved in affecting the security posture of an organization.
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Events in-scope were strategic level decisions that relate to the identification, protection,
detection, response and recovery of business assets, including but not limited to patient health
information, business support systems (e.g. payroll) and biomedical devices.
Processes. Processes in-scope are strategic level activities and management activities
related to understanding what knowledge and inputs factors on informing management on
strategic information security decisions are. Additionally, the operational execution of this
strategic vision and the company culture associated with information security was investigated.

Ethical Considerations
Internal or sensitive information may have been disclosed during the research activity
that could have caused harm to the research participant personally or to the organization the
research participant represents.
Multiple techniques were employed to address these ethical considerations, convey trust
and promote full, honest responses. IRB approval was sought prior to collecting any data. All
research participants were required to listen and acknowledge an informed consent declaration
that clearly communicates their rights and expectations to privacy as a participant in the study.
Participants and their organization were de-identified. A mapping tool identifying participants
and organizations with their unique study identifier was maintained with strict access controls
and data at rest encryption. All data was protected in accordance with approved IRB
requirements.
The researcher would have entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) with research
participants if the research participant organization required it. This assumes the NDA does not
prevent any aspect of the data analysis or findings disclosure described in chapter 3. This was not
exercised by any participants.
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The researcher utilized a defer technique when a research participant inquired to the
interviewer about the interviewer’s views on a topic. For example, if a research participant
asked, “what should I know about the HIPAA security rule”. The researcher would reply “I do
not want to influence your responses. I’ll be happy to discuss upon the conclusion of this
research study”, to avoid researcher bias or influence on participant responses.

Definitions
Certain terms are used throughout this document that can have different meanings based
on background, experience and perspective. Definitions for key terms are provided in Appendix
A. The purpose of defining these key terms is to establish a common language within the scope
of this research and its findings.

Assumptions
The researcher was an active participant in this research study. Additionally, the
researcher was coding, abstracting and developing the grounded theory. The researcher’s
assumptions are therefore critical to identify both for the researcher and consumers of the study’s
findings.
Enumeration of these assumptions limit the researcher bias influence on the findings (Birks
& Mills, 2015, p. 20). Researcher’s assumptions were:
● Any previous healthcare experience by the researcher did not influence research
participants.
● In-scope SHPOs’ participants are for-profit entities.
● Healthcare provider organizations are making assumptions that IT staff are also handling
information security.
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● Healthcare provider organizations with inadequate information security controls would
not want to know about it.

Scope, Limitations, Delimitations
The scope of this research is detailed in “bounding the study” section of Chapter 1.
Grounded theory was used as an exploratory research method. This research applied to SHPO in
the state of South Carolina. This research is assumed to be generalizable to other US
geographies, but not to other healthcare entities that are non-providers such as clearinghouse and
insurers. This research is assumed to be not transferable to these non-provider types because of
the distinction that healthcare providers uniquely work with biomedical devices, have ownership
of permanent medical records and provide treatment to individuals.
Grounded theory is a qualitative research method that uses inductive reasoning to develop
a theory from observed data. This approach to research does not start with a hypothesis to test
through deductive reasoning, but instead creates a theory that then can be used later in deductive
reasoning-based research. This is an appropriate research method choice for this study given the
limited research that has been conducted in this area.
Orthodox practice of traditional grounded theory requires no literature review prior to
engaging in data generation and collection (B. G. a. S. Glaser, A.L., 1967) . The idea behind this
approach is to reduce researcher bias into subconsciously fitting the data to fit existing literature
instead of having the theory developed exclusively based on collected data. A literature review
was conducted given this study was in support of a dissertation research project and a literature
review was a required component of this project. Every effort to limit researcher bias was
utilized to avoid this issue introduced by the literature review.
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Chapter Summary
There are regulatory, ethical and pragmatic business reasons for small healthcare
providers organizations to implement information security controls at their business, yet surveys
and incidents have demonstrated this market is insufficiently addressing protecting its assets
from realized threats, detecting when incidents have occurred and effectively recovering from
these incidents without suffering significant impact.
Grounded theory is a research methodology that develops a theory based heavily on data
collected from individuals experiencing the phenomena being studied, in this case individuals
responsible for information security at small healthcare providers. Grounded theory provides a
method to conduct exploratory research, an approach that aligns with the lack of research being
performed in this area.
A literature review provides an understanding of what research has been done in this area
to date and what factors shape the reality of the setting. The following chapter provides insight
into the developments of small business information security and discuss the nuances a
healthcare setting overlays on these types of businesses.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Healthcare cybersecurity is a key public health concern that needs immediate and
aggressive attention.
- (FORCE, 2017)
Information security within the healthcare industry is a complicated area of interest.
There are several factors to consider including securing the systems that enable direct patient
care (i.e. Electronic Health Records (EHR)), ancillary patient care (i.e. lab, x-rays), and business
management (i.e. scheduling, billing). The data within these systems must also be secured from a
security risk (e.g. integrity of a patient’s drug allergies) and a privacy risk (e.g. a patient's HIV
status). Regulation, threats, risks, vulnerabilities and impact must be considered for these
systems and data when approaching information security program management.
Healthcare information systems (HIS), such as the EHR, are comprehensive repositories
of patient care history, used not only by healthcare providers but also patients, family members,
payers and others engaged in the business of healthcare, researchers, and government agencies.
Unfortunately, this utility and data-rich environment attracts criminals (Luna, Rhine, Myhra,
Sullivan, & Kruse, 2016).
Healthcare information systems and technology are complex. They are integrated,
provide patient care and contain individual’s personal health information. The security and
resilience of these systems is important to individuals whose information is stored in the systems
and to the healthcare professionals that rely on the information as a communication tool to
provide care to patients. The healthcare provider is concerned with the security and resilience of
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these systems to comply with regulations and to provide quality patient care to patients. The
confidentiality, availability and integrity of healthcare systems is therefore critical.
Small businesses within this sector have the same challenges and requirements as larger
businesses with less access to financial and information security expertise resources.
The following literature review provides a review of regulations affecting the healthcare
industry, the cyber threats, risks and controls healthcare providers must evaluate when making
information security program decisions and the nuances of a small business.

Healthcare Information Security
Whitman and Mattord (Whitman & Mattord, 2011) define information security as “the
protection of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information assets, whether in storage,
processing or transmission; achieved via the application of policy, education, training and
awareness, and technology”.
Systems and environments have security requirements defined by the organization that
address the information security objectives. These requirements are implemented through
security controls.
Rohn et al. (Rohn et al., 2016) defines a control as a measure intended to reduce risk to a
level acceptable by management. IT internal controls at a governance level involve ensuring that
effective IT management and security principles, policies and processes with appropriate
compliance measurement tools to assess and measure those controls are in place and operate
effectively (Rohn et al., 2016).
Controls have different associated costs and effectiveness for reducing risk, and
categorically, controls can be physical, technical or administrative in nature (Herold & Beaver,
2004). Risk management allows for organizations to analyze and decide what controls to
implement that reduces risk to acceptable levels (Peltier, 2005). The analysis and selection
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depend on business need and security requirements according to Barnard and von Solms
(Barnard & Von Solms, 2000). The factors that influence security control selection were
expanded by Otero, Otero and Qureshi (Otero, Otero, & Qureshi, 2010) to include cost of
implementation, scheduling and resource availability. Furthermore, security control selection
must consider the integration into operational processes as research has shown legitimate users
will circumvent security for usability and benefit gains (Albrechtsen, 2007)
The Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative (Initiative, 2011) defined information
security risk as “the risk associated with the operation and use of information systems that
support the missions and business functions of their organizations”. Information security risk is
based on the likelihood and impact of a threat being realized (NIST, 2012). The NIST Special
Publication 800-30 revision 1 categorizes threats as one of the following:
● Hostile cyber or physical attacks,
● Human errors of omission or commission,
● Structural failures of organization-controlled resources (e.g., hardware, software,
environmental controls), and
● Natural and man-made disasters, accidents, and failures beyond the control of the
organization
There are multiple supported information security related threat taxonomies in the
literature, some focused on the healthcare industry (Kotz, 2011; Landry, Pardue, Johnsten,
Campbell, & Patidar, 2011; NIST, 2012). Security controls mitigate the event of a risk being
realized, that is a threat exploiting a weakness resulting in a negatively impacting event.
Mandiant (Mandiant, 2016) reported the three most significant realized risk trends were
business disruption attacks, massive data breaches of personally identifiable information (PII),
and an increased in compromised networking devices.
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These trends continue to plague the healthcare industry today. Business disruption attacks
include ransomware, malicious software that encrypts system files and requires the system owner
to pay a fee to a criminal to obtain the decryption key. Ransomware has significantly impacted
the healthcare industry and is rampant in its application, accounting for over 70% of all
malicious software attacks on healthcare providers from 2015-2017 (Verizon, 2018). The
availability to systems and data is important for healthcare providers to provide patient care. This
necessity is being exploited by cyber criminals through ransomware. Ransomware attacks on
healthcare entities has increased significantly since 2016 with several notable attacks including
MedStar and Hollywood Presbyterian (Davis, 2017; Hegwer, 2017; Kruse, Frederick, Jacobson,
& Monticone, 2017; Millman, 2016).
Massive data breaches of PHI are regular occurrences in healthcare with over 1292
reported in 2015-2017 (Verizon, 2018). Luna et al. (Luna et al., 2016) supported this PHI/PII
data breach threat trend with research showing data theft is the greatest threat to healthcare with
the intended purpose being to commit identity theft.
Kruse et al. (Kruse et al., 2017) conducted a systematic literature review across three
major medical research databases to understand current trends and threats to organizations within
the healthcare industry. The research affirmed the healthcare industry struggles with new
technology, especially with U.S. federal policy promoting an increasing use of technology by
healthcare provider organizations, and security in response to evolving cyber threats. The
research also stated the healthcare industry lags other industries in securing data, however the
databases queried were healthcare-specific databases and the thirty-one papers included in the
review did not include any papers explicitly evaluating the healthcare sector against other
sectors.
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Luna et.al (Luna et al., 2016) conducted a literature review on cybercrime themes and
trends in healthcare across four research databases, resulting in nineteen papers being selected
for inclusion. Two broad cybercrime areas, that were identified, are unauthorized access by
internal parties possible because of known vulnerabilities in the system and external parties
disclosing data beyond its intended scope of use.
Researchers “Independent Security Evaluators” (Evaluators, 2016) conducted a 24-month
security assessment of 12 healthcare facilities and found that remote adversaries have a high
likelihood of successfully exploiting healthcare systems showcasing the vulnerability and
immaturity of healthcare organizations with respect to cyber security. Systemic causes of these
weaknesses were identified as lack of executive support, insufficient talent, improper
implementations of technology, outdated understanding of adversaries, lack of leadership, and a
misguided reliance upon compliance (Evaluators, 2016).
“Independent Security Evaluators” (Evaluators, 2016) research highlighted the state of
information security by finding even fundamentals are not being properly implemented including
the development and adherence to policy and procedures, the lack of audit capability to assess
the presence or effectiveness of security controls and the practice of deploying technologies
insecurely and misaligned to enterprise architecture (Evaluators, 2016).
An independent research organization, The Ponemon Institute (Institute, 2016),
conducted a survey in 2015 to gauge the state of cybersecurity in healthcare. The survey of 535
IT and IT security healthcare professionals. High level findings found that healthcare
organizations experience on average almost one cyber-attack per month.
Eighty-eight percent of respondents worked for an organization with 100-500 employees.
This organization size is more aligned to a medium-sized business per various definitions of
business sizes. Therefore, this research while not excluding large and small-sized healthcare
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organizations, is heavily skewed toward medium-sized entities (Institute, 2016). Of note, the
most common security incident noted in the Ponemon study (2016) was exploitation of existing
software vulnerabilities. This infers organizations were not patching their systems and software
(Institute, 2016). Finally, sixty-seven percent of respondents stated their cybersecurity posture
was not effective because of a lack of coordination with other business functions (76%), lack of
resources (73%) and cybersecurity not being a priority (65%) (Institute, 2016).
Fernando and Dawson’s (Fernando & Dawson, 2009) research found conflict between
healthcare providers and privacy and security controls. The research, based on a structured
interview with twenty-six clinician respondents on healthcare information system privacy and
security experiences, found efforts by clinicians to avoid conflict and emphasize patient care
above privacy and security tended to result as security breaches. Also, privacy and security
specific fiscal and regulatory factors conflicted with improved patient care outcomes.
Verizon’s PHI Data Breach Report (Verizon, 2018) found of 1360 incidents, where data
was either confirmed as disclosed or was at risk, 57.5% were caused by internal actors, as
opposed to the commonly seen external actors. The report highlighted financial incentives and
curiosity as the primary factors motivating insiders to abuse their access (Verizon, 2018). This is
pertinent in the healthcare industry as several different medical related frauds may be perpetrated
with a patient's medical record, and the curiosity to look at a family member or celebrity’s
medical record. Schoew’s (Schoew, 2018) anecdotal research showed 18% of healthcare
professionals would sell their healthcare credentials for $500-$1000.
Hoffman (Hoffman, 2015) claims the healthcare industry has been significantly impacted
by poor information security controls identifying 90% of healthcare providers experienced a data
breach within the period of 2012-2014. Healthcare is expected to continue to be a targeted
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industry given the value of healthcare data in illegal marketplaces and the continued increase
year over year of cyber-attacks on healthcare entities (Hegwer, 2017; Kruse et al., 2017).
Poor information security controls and desirable data assets make healthcare an attractive
target to cyber criminals. Symantec’s survey (Symantec, 2017) reflected this increasing threat. In
2017, Healthcare saw an increase in malicious email containing malware from 1 in 396 emails to
1 in 204. This Symantec’s survey (2017) data showed a 4.2% decline in PHI lost in breaches in
2016, although these statistics appear to be skewed by a major PII and financial breach related to
the Friend Finder Network that experienced a breach of 412 million user accounts in 2016. The
same report (Symantec, 2017) showed health services was the second highest percentage, 11.2%,
of sectors experiencing breach incidents.
The anticipated sustainment in healthcare targeted attacks are supported by the
proliferation of patient health data. Patient health data can be used by healthcare providers in
multiple ways and duplicating electronic data is trivial. Additionally, medical systems are
expensive to procure leading healthcare providers motivated to realize the maximum amount of
value from the system regardless if underlying technologies go unsupported by vendors due to
technology end-of-life (Hoffman, 2015).
The American Hospital Association (Association, 2016) highlighted the significance of
proper cybersecurity in healthcare and the need for senior leadership to be thinking about it.
They produced literature for their constituency that promotes the activity of healthcare
organizations considering information security fundamentals such as cybersecurity planning,
accountability and cyber insurance.
The Health Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS), a global, causebased, not-for-profit organization focused on better health through information technology,
conducts an annual information security executive survey to gauge healthcare organizations
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current concerns, issues, and direction. The 2015 survey was completed by 297 professionals
with information security responsibility at a healthcare organization (HIMSS, 2015). Eightyseven percent of represented organizations identified information security as a higher business
priority. This is supported with the metric that over half of these organizations have a Chief
Information Security Officer (CISO) or other full-time employee with managing information
security as a full-time responsibility (HIMSS, 2015). Meanwhile, the HIMSS survey results
reinforced a common issue currently plaguing healthcare organizations. A lack of staffing and
financial resources were key barriers to properly addressing information security. This translates
to a lack of knowledge to implement or execute proper information security, and a lack of
financial support via a lack of support from senior management, either from a miscommunicated
narrative of actual organizational information security risk or a "tone-deaf ear” by management
to accepted organizational risk (HIMSS, 2015).
Finally, research designed to understand the criticality of specific threats to healthcare
information security, determined power loss was the most critical (Samy, Ahmad, & Ismail,
2009). Structured interviews were conducted on sixteen staff members across three different
departments and with a variety of roles at a single healthcare provider in Malaysia.
Unfortunately, the generalizability of the research is suspect based on the fact all
participants worked for the same healthcare provider. For example, it is possible that healthcare
provider had experienced multiple power losses resulting in a skewed perspective of this threat to
interviewees.

Governmental Factors
There are regulations healthcare providers must consider when making information
security decisions and providing healthcare related service. Government incentives have resulted
in the acceleration of healthcare providers adopting technologies and solutions that support their
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business function of providing healthcare, and additionally increases the risk healthcare
providers are assuming by digitally storing sensitive data through increased access opportunity,
an inability to detect unauthorized access and the ease with which many patient records can be
compromised.
United States based healthcare providers are legally required to provide minimum
security and privacy controls in their business practices. The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) enacted into law in 1996 and updated in 2000 and 2003 to include
the Privacy Rule and Security Rule, respectively, makes it mandatory for providers to implement
policies and procedures focused on protecting patient health information ("HIPAA History,"
2017).
Relative to information security requirements, HIPAA contains the security rule, the
privacy rule and a breach notification rule. The security rule establishes national standards to
protect individuals’ electronic personal health information that is created, received, used, or
maintained by a covered entity through appropriate administrative, physical and technical
safeguards ensuring confidentiality, integrity and availability of the electronic PHI (HHS.gov,
2017b). The privacy rule establishes a set of national standards for the protection of certain
health information including an individual’s past, present or future physical or mental health, the
past, present, or future payment associated with provision of healthcare, or the actual provision
of healthcare through controls around the access, disclosure and retention of that data
(Assistance, 2003). The breach notification rule requires HIPAA covered entities and their
business associates to provide notification to affected individuals following a breach of
unsecured PHI (HHS.gov, 2013). These requirements introduce additional cost, man-power,
expertise and time to properly implement, operate and continuously monitor. The Enforcement
Rule was added to HIPAA in 2006 and authorized the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) to issue
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financial penalties for entity that fails to implement HIPAA privacy and security rule ("HIPAA
History," 2017).
HIPAA requires security and privacy but does not offer any direction on how to
systematically implement an information security program strategically or tactically. This has
caused many healthcare organizations to make a “best effort” at securing systems and properly
ensuring patient data privacy. “Best effort” is a product of resources, time and expertise a
healthcare organization can commit to such an endeavor.
HIPAA federally requires healthcare providers to secure their data and systems. HIPAA
was criticized for the lack of federal regulation compliance enforcement (Collins, 2007).
Following criticism, the first penalty for HIPAA non-compliance occurred in 2008, 12 years
after the law was put into effect.
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH)
was passed in 2009 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009.
HITECH had many impacts on the healthcare industry from a regulation perspective. It
incentivized healthcare providers to improve IT infrastructure and encouraged the “meaningful
use” of EHR systems. HITECH introduced the Enforcement Interim Rule that outlined a tiered
structure to HIPAA violation financial penalties and increased the overall financial penalties
themselves.
In 2010, in support of the HITECH EHR “meaningful use” regulation, the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented a program providing financial incentive
payouts to healthcare providers that meet criteria for efficient and patient-centered use of EHR
solutions. Meaningful use was positioned to support timeliness of service and accessibility of
patient records to authorized individuals ("HIPAA History," 2017). Demonstrating Stage 1, the
initial stage, of meaningful use is based on fifteen core objectives plus five additional “menu”
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objectives. One of the fifteen is to “Protect electronic health information” and is measured by
performing a security risk analysis annually and remediating or mitigating weaknesses
discovered during risk analysis (HealthIT.gov, 2012).
The “meaningful use” initiative in HITECH Act has promoted and caused an increase in
the use of electronic medical records, information technology within the healthcare setting and
network reliance (Kruse et al., 2017). This incentive was so appealing that adoption rates of
EHRs went from 12.2% in 2009 to 83.8% in 2015 (HealthIt.gov, 2018). This increase in
technology expanded the attack surface that healthcare entities must protect and defend while
increasing the volume of electronic medical data in existence. Maintaining meaningful use for
quality improvement requires ongoing support for leadership and change management (Green et
al., 2015).
The HIPAA Omnibus Final Rule was issued in 2013 and expanded the scope of HIPAA.
It incorporates improved data security, ePHI access, the requirement of Business Associate
Agreements (BAA), and breach notification requirements for both covered entities and business
associates.
The 21st Century Cures Act was passed into law in late 2016. This law’s purpose is “to
accelerate the discovery, development, and delivery of 21st century cures, and
for other purposes”. This law allows qualified, independent third-parties to be certification
authorities for healthcare related software and systems. Specifically, the Act states third-parties
certifiers are prioritized based on expertise in multiple areas, including security. It is worth
noting this does not require a third-party vendor to have expertise in security though, as a
situation may occur where a third-party certifier lacking expertise is the only one to compete and
thus be the best option.
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The Act bolsters information sharing while explicitly calling out the need to ensure
security, calling for the assembly of a working group within one year of the Act passing to report
on the allowance of use and disclosure of PHI for research purposes. The working group must
have consideration for privacy rights implication and models for secure access of the data assets.
Organizations that suffer a breach of an individual’s PHI are required to notify the
individual within 60 days (HHS.gov, 2013). HHS OCR, the HIPAA enforcement office, utilizes
general deterrence theory to promote information security practices with covered entities and
business associates, such as healthcare providers. If a data breach impacts more than 500 unique
individuals, the organization is publicly shamed on the HHS OCR breach portal website
(HHS.gov, 2018a). HHS OCR enforcement has become highly visible, investigating large
privacy and security breach cases and levying noteworthy financial penalties, including
Advocate Healthcare for $5.5M and New York Presbyterian for $4.8M. It is interesting to note
these material financial penalties may curb behavior, but in 2016 and 2015 only 0.0537% and
0.0339%, respectively, of HHS OCR PHI breach cases resulted in any financial impact to the
investigated organization (HHS.gov, 2018b).
Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience
Healthcare and Public Health directed the federal government to secure and make resilient
organizations that are deemed critical infrastructure (House, 2013). This was set in policy
through Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. This
knowingly applies to both public and private sector organizations that align to critical
infrastructure, such as financial institutions, power companies and healthcare providers. HHS is
the sector-specific agency for the healthcare sector. Under this order, information security
sharing communication channels have been established in the form of the National Health
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (NH-ISAC). Additionally, the National Institute of
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Standards and Technology (NIST) were empowered to develop a cybersecurity framework that
could be implemented by critical infrastructure organizations voluntarily (Paul Proctor, 2016).
Healthcare providers leverage technology to provide patient care in many situations. The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the federal agency charged with governing biomedical
devices functionality and security (Administration, 2018). Biomedical devices must receive FDA
certification before they authorized to be utilized in clinical environments. The FDA
(Administration, 2016) has released guidance around the secure operation and management of
biomedical devices in “Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices”. This
document provides a reference to healthcare providers in the effective execution of medical
device risk management, and the reporting and remediating of security vulnerabilities. The FDA
is responsible for the security of biomedical devices, but the direction from the agency is
presented in the form of guidance and does not have gravity to enforce compliance. This is most
notably seen in the Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices” where the
first words of the document are “Contains Nonbinding Recommendations”.
There is also relevant South Carolina state law that applied to this research. South
Carolina passed the Financial Identity Fraud and Identity Theft Protection Act in 2013. This law
requires South Carolina organizations that suffer a data breach involving 1000 or more
individuals’ personal information to notify the affected individuals and pay up to a $1000 per
individual fine ("SC Code of Laws - Title 39 - Chapter 1 - General Provisions," 2018).

Healthcare Technology
Shekelle, Morton, and Keeler’s (Shekelle, Morton, & Keeler, 2006) systematic review of
literature on technology in healthcare identified it has many applications and potential to reduce
healthcare costs, improve the safety and efficiency of patient care and outcome. Goldzweig,
Towfigh, Maglione, and Shekelle’s (Goldzweig, Towfigh, Maglione, & Shekelle, 2009) updated
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review of the literature showed these benefits continue to be seen with the addition of a positive
financial impact for the healthcare provider business.
Healthcare technology is a diverse field. Dixon, Zafar, and McGowan (Dixon, Zafar, &
McGowan, 2007) developed a taxonomy for healthcare information technology to support a
searchable knowledge base that defines the interrelationships among health IT planning,
implementation and evaluation. This taxonomy presents the potential scope a healthcare provider
may possess for an information technology footprint to secure. The taxonomy, presented in table
below, is based on inputs from a panel of medical information experts from across the United
States (Dixon et al., 2007).
Table 2 - Healthcare information technology taxonomy (Dixon et al., 2007)
Major Category
Minor Category
A. Financial
B. Planning
I. Organizational Strategy

C. Process Change
D. Implementation of Health IT
E. Policy
A. Mobile
B. Infrastructure
C Security

II. Technology

D. Standards
E. Electronic Health
F. Telehealth
G. Health Information Exchange (HIE)

III. Value

A. Research
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Minor Category
B. Evaluation Outcomes
A. Sample Legal Documents

IV. Laws and Regulations

B. Privacy
C. Security
D. Government
A . Professional Societies
B. Payers

V. Organizations

C. Governmental
D. Nonprofit Organizations
E. Magazines
A. Governance
B. Project Management

VI. Operations

C. Systems
D. Dissemination

In addition to traditional IT systems, disruptive technology, such as Internet-of-Things
(IoT) and cloud-based systems are resulting in tectonic shifts in the way technology is integrated
into businesses that introduces privacy and security concerns (O'Brien, Budish, Faris, Gasser, &
Lin, 2016). Tarouco et al. (Tarouco et al., 2012) showed IoT devices are increasing in healthcare
related usage, and may increase security risk. Furthermore, cloud systems are being utilized by
healthcare businesses to offset cost and management of technology, but at the risk of storing
sensitive data in other businesses’ systems (Sultan, 2014).
The HITECH Act spurned a rapid computerization of healthcare providers, manifesting
in a significantly high rate of implemented EHR systems (HealthIt.gov, 2018). Halamka and
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Tripathi (Halamka & Tripathi, 2017) provide evidence that a primary end user, the clinicians,
were negatively impacted by this rapid adoption. EHR vendors, while benefiting greatly from the
legislative force to procure their products, were also impacted. Deficiencies for users and
vendors have been identified in five key areas: usability, workflow, innovation, interoperability
and patient engagement (Halamka & Tripathi, 2017).
Kruse et al. (Kruse et al., 2017) systematic literature review affirmed the healthcare
industry struggles with new technology, especially with U.S. federal policy promoting an
increasing use of technology by healthcare provider organizations, and security in response to
evolving cyber threats.
In addition to a user base that demonstrates challenge integrating technology and an
active role in circumventing security controls the technology may introduce, Green et al. (Green
et al., 2015) showed the maintenance of the EHR after implementation requires continual expert
technical support to address upgrades and security needs.

Management Impact
NIST Special Publication 800-37 revision 1, when addressing the importance of
leadership to an organization’s information security posture, states “Given the significant and
growing danger of these threats, it is imperative that leaders at all levels of an organization
understand their responsibilities for achieving adequate information security and for managing
information system-related security risks” (NIST, 2010).
Peltier (Peltier, 2005) claimed support of risk management by senior management is a
demonstration of its due diligence. He expanded on this claim by stating the role of senior
management is to ensure necessary resources are effectively applied to develop the capabilities
to meet mission requirements (Peltier, 2005).
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Hoffman (Hoffman, 2015) highlighted the pivotal role senior management plays in
enterprise adoption of information security controls, specifically taking a more active role in
supporting and understanding information security elements of the business.
Barton, Tejay, Lane and Terrell (Barton, Tejay, Lane, & Terrell, 2016) showed the
importance of the role senior management performs in assuring that information security is
supported. This research found senior management's ability to shape beliefs and culture of staff,
and to allocate resources and set priorities had direct impact on achieving effective information
security in an organization (Barton et al., 2016). Barton et al. (Barton et al., 2016) also found that
senior management belief in information security leads to greater participation in IT security
governance by senior management. Francis, Xiaohong, Jinsheng, and Hong (Francis, Xiaohong,
Jinsheng, & Hong, 2013) similarly showed “tone at the top” through visible and actionable
support from senior management of an effective training and awareness program promotes
adoption of new information security-enabled procedures and overall information security
program success.
Eilon (Eilon, 1969) defined the decision process as the activity of analyzing information
material, defining performance measures to determine how a course of action will be judged,
enumerating and predicting possible outcomes, and selecting a course of action based on choice
criteria. Healthcare provider’s leadership must make decisions when addressing information
security risks and regulations.
Bhattacharya (Bhattacharya, 2011) found transactional leadership styles led to greater
information security concern by staff at small businesses. A transactional leadership style
rewards for compliant behavior and punishes for non-compliant behavior (Bass, 2008).
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Small Business Challenges
57.8% of healthcare providers in the United States are small businesses and have 10
physicians or less (Kane, 2017). Healthcare-based businesses are managing the industry specific
information security challenges discussed above.
Current research shows that small businesses are vulnerable to cybercrime and
experiencing an increase in cyberattacks, compounding the challenge’s magnitude (Institute,
2017). Small businesses are being increasingly targeted by cyber criminals because of their
limited implemented security controls and the increased proficiency of criminals to automate
web-based attacks (Chickowski, 2010).
Rohn et al. (Rohn et al., 2016) investigated information technology security practices of
small businesses, through document review and semi-structured interviews, and found low levels
of small businesses management awareness of information security threats increased the
organizations vulnerability to information security breaches because of an unsupported optimism
of the small businesses information security posture. Increasing awareness addresses the issue of
misjudging current security posture but does not assure action to reduce risk. Johnson and Koch
(Johnson & Koch, 2006) found even when small business owners are concerned and aware of
cyber threats they are not willing to take action to defend or pay for protection.
Large healthcare organizations, much like any large business, can have specialized
resources available that can be dedicated and focused toward an effort such as implementing an
information security program. Small and medium-sized healthcare organizations, much like
small and medium-sized businesses, are resource-constrained and do not have the opportunity to
dedicate resources to programmatic information security to protect their data and assets
(Bagwell, 2016). Unfortunately, medical practices with limited financial, technical, and
organizational resources not associated with larger systems typically lack access to the necessary
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technical expertise, financial resources, and leverage with vendors to meet the needs of
maintaining an EHR alone (Green et al., 2015).
Cybercriminals are targeting small businesses. Business email compromise (BEC)
attacks, an attack where a criminal sends email impersonating a business senior leader to request
a subordinate to take an action (i.e. transfer money), occurred on average 400 times every day,
with small- and medium-sized businesses the most targeted (Symantec, 2017).
Van Ommen’s (Van Ommen, 2014) quantitative research aimed to determine a causal
link between a small businesses IT security implementation maturity and its security incident
occurrence. He was unable to determine if there is a relationship between a small business’s IT
security maturity level and the number of incidents experienced by the business. This research
was based on survey questionnaire responses and had a population of sixteen responses calling
into question the validity of the results. Supporting the suspect validity of this research, Van
Ommen (2014) states “the method of gathering data about the occurrence of IT security related
incidents used in this study turned out not to be the best way available, but this study lacked the
resources and time to perform a more thorough case study”.

Conclusion
Much of healthcare organizations are small businesses. These organizations are at high
risk of information security and privacy incidents. These organizations hold valuable data assets
and are being targeted by cyber criminals for them, but often have limited financial, knowledge
and technical resources to protect these assets sufficiently. Compounding the problem, federal
incentive programs have resulted in a massive adoption of technology that was not always based
on need or interest by the procuring organization, resulting in inadequate security controls; when
small business users provide patient care with “misfit” technology, the ongoing maintenance of
that technology may be low priority.
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Moreover, there are many healthcare related, information security threats that must be
considered when making risk related decisions. Disruptive technologies like Cloud and Internet
of Things are expanding attack surfaces and distributing an organization’s PHI storage locations.
Internal and external threat actors, environmental, and natural threats may negatively impact a
healthcare organization’s ability to operate if not properly mitigated, avoided or transference.
Leaders of small healthcare businesses significantly impact the direction and actions
taken by the organization. The information security attitude and culture promoted by these
stakeholders shapes the approach the organization has toward secure practices. These leaders
must account for federal HIPAA regulations, South Carolina law, and the availability needs of its
systems and data for business operation needs. Unfortunately, they may have a false perception
of information security threats and their organization’s capability and capacity to address them.
Low levels of small businesses management awareness of information security threats increase
the organization’s vulnerability to information security breaches because of an unsupported
optimism of the small businesses information security posture (Rohn et al., 2016).
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
There are multiple methodologies to conduct research (Creswell, 2014). According to
Bryant (M. T. Bryant, 2003), the research method a researcher chooses should be influenced by
the nature of the questions being asked. This qualitative research studied the decision processes
of small healthcare businesses information security program management to understand factors,
motivations, influences and thought affecting these programs effectiveness.
This chapter provides greater detail into the research design structure and the
appropriateness of the design. Grounded theory systematic design for application to this research
is documented, providing an explanation of the tools that were used to develop a theory
grounded in data. The data collection and analysis processes, including the interactions and
expectations from participants is documented. A detailed explanation of how trustworthiness of
the research is provided including provisions that are incorporated into the design to promote
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability.

Research Methods and Design Appropriateness
Qualitative research has seen a significant adoption by the academic community over the
last 30 years and is considered an accepted method of conducting research, especially
exploratory research (Huberman & Miles, 2002). This research utilizes a grounded theory
research methodology with an interpretivist worldview. Grounded theory is a methodology
pioneered by Glaser and Strauss in the late 1960’s that moved qualitative inquiry from a
descriptive study into an explanatory theoretical framework, allowing for a deeper understanding
of the studied phenomena (Charmaz, 2006).
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A qualitative research design is appropriate for this research area given the limited
research in the area of small healthcare provider business information security, the inadequate
security control implementation in the healthcare industry (Holtzman, 2017) and the subjective
factors that drive decision makers at small healthcare provider organizations. An inductively
developed theory explaining the process that management at small healthcare businesses engage
to implement, maintain and justify their information security decisions was contributed to the
body of knowledge.
Grounded theory specifically aligns with this area of research. It supports exploratory
research, relying heavily on the experiences and interpretations of the participants in the setting.
The researcher investigates areas of interest as they present themselves through concurrent data
generation and analysis. This research freedom complements the inductive approach to data
analysis and fits the need of a research area that is lacking significant academic research, such as
this study (Birks & Mills, 2015).
Additionally, grounded theory supports deductive data analysis. Researchers can apply
developing theories retrospectively to previously executed interviews or memos to affirm the
findings or provide negative case analysis to refine the theory. The researcher believes
understanding how these organizations are processing and implementing their decisions is
understood through the analysis of their experiences, and that their reality of the phenomena is
critical for informing any theory that provides an explanation to that process.
Grounded theory provides a systematic procedure for inquiry (Creswell, 2014). There are
essential grounded theory methods, documented in the data collection and data analysis sections
below, that are considered required to be used for a study to qualify as grounded theory (Birks &
Mills, 2015). This bolsters the likelihood of quality, consistency and accuracy in adherence to the
grounded theory research methodology. This does not guarantee grounded theory though as
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many studies claiming to be grounded theory are actually not for various reasons including noninclusion of the above-mentioned required methods.
A primary method of data collection was intensive interviewing. Grounded theory is
based on user experiences that can be gathered through interviews. The interviews were
unstructured initially. A set of open-ended questions will be used to allow for free-flowing
responses from participants. These questions can be found in Appendix B. The interviews
transitioned to semi-structured as themes began to develop. Both methods are appropriate for
exploratory studies that involve questions with complex answers that may vary from respondent
to respondent (Saunders et al., 2009).
Interviews were transcribed to support qualitative data analysis processes and to
strengthen descriptive validity. Participant responses were analyzed for codes, themes and
categories in accordance with grounded theory processes.
Additionally, memos were generated throughout the research process. Memos are
essential to generating a grounded theory and are treated as data as well. According to Lempert
(Lempert, 2007) memos document the analytical interpretation of collected and analyzed data
allowing researchers to organize analysis and findings while keeping it grounded in the data.

Population, Site and Sampling
Target organizations for this research are healthcare provider organizations within the
state of South Carolina that have 10 or less physicians on staff. Target research participants are
individuals that work within management or leadership roles in small healthcare provider
practices within South Carolina that are accountable for information security at the SHPO. If a
SHPO has more than one individual accountable for information security, all accountable
individuals were interviewed in a focus group to avoid gaps in responses or conflicting responses
from separate interviews. There are no age, gender, or ethnicity criteria for research participants.
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The population sampling strategy utilized snowball sampling, a strategy of using referrals
from research participants (Berg, 2004). All research participants met the criteria stated above,
and the researcher asked current research participants to recommend potential candidates for the
study. As the grounded theory methodology was executed the sampling strategy incorporated
theoretical sampling, a classic sampling strategy of grounded theory. Glaser and Strauss (B. G. a.
S. Glaser, A.L., 1967) define theoretical sampling as “the process of data collection for
generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses his data and decides
what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges”.
Grounded theory places the researcher as a subjective active participant in data
generation with the participant (Birks & Mills, 2015). The raw data from the participants ground
any developed abstraction or theory, but it is the researcher’s interpretation that constructs these
abstractions and theories. Focus remained on understanding the meaning participants hold about
the problem. It was possible through theoretical sensitivity that the scope of participants
increased to include staff at participant organizations.
The study investigated SHPO and the processes management exercises to make
information security decisions. Interviews were the primary method for data generation.
Interviews occurred over an overtly recorded teleconference medium to facilitate convenience,
support honest responses and reduce participant error. The rigidity of the research setting
reduced research variability and promoted research participant comfort and privacy.
Charmaz (Charmaz, 2006) pointed out the orthodox accepted answer of how many
participants are needed to reach saturation is not a number, but based on when gathering new
data does not spark new theoretical insights. Therefore, this can be a small sample size, although
the smaller the size and the larger the claim from the data, the greater scrutiny of credibility.
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Creswell provides guidance to grounded theory researchers, based on Creswell’s (2014) review
of qualitative studies, finding grounded theory typically needs 20-30 participants for saturation.

Data Collection and Procedures
IRB approval was obtained prior to collecting any data. This research involved human
subjects as participants.
All participants were provided a verbal informed consent detailing the purpose of this
research, the type of research, why they were selected as a research participant, that participation
was voluntary, the participant expectations, the duration of the participants engagement, the risks
and benefits of participating, their right to withdraw from the research at any time, and how data
was secured. Data security covers all attributes of the research, including the participants
information, responses and data generated, and informs on how this data will remain confidential
with purpose to protect the confidentiality, integrity and privacy of the data.
Research participants were required to listen and acknowledge a verbal informed consent
prior to interviewing. The research was conducted in accordance with the consent terms.
The primary method of participant generated data collection was intensive interviewing.
These interviews did not last more than one hour per session and occurred between September
2018 and February 2019. An essential method of grounded theory is the ability for concurrent
data generation and analysis (Birks & Mills, 2015). Results from this study were presented in
March 2019, and data was generated and added to refine the developed theory very late in the
research process.
The researcher’s intent was to use one-on-one interview format. If an organization had
more than one individual accountable for information security, all accountable individuals were
interviewed in a focus group. The research unit of analysis is the business thus the intent was to
avoid partial or conflicting responses from being collected. Focus group interviews have pros
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and cons compared to individual interviews. Research has shown focus group interviews can
provide a better understanding of complex processes because participants question and answer
each other revealing more (Morgan, 1996). Additionally, Morgan (1996) points out the
researcher can ask for experience comparisons allowing for richer understanding of the process.
There was a risk of not receiving full responses from a participant during a focus group
interview. Participants may have been reluctant to share stories of not having followed policy,
circumventing process or other incriminating behavior that could result in sanction. Smithson
(Smithson, 2000) points out there is a risk of a dominant voice in focus groups which can prevent
alternative perspectives and experiences from being disclosed. The selection of interview or
focus group for each participant engagement depended on setting and research needs.
Grounded theory promotes unstructured and semi-structured interview question formats.
Purposefully the researcher was attempting to generate data and interpret the interviewees
experiences with minimal bias and avoid ‘forcing the data’ by using open-ended, unstructured
questions to promote interviewee rich responses. Interpretive validity provisions were employed
to promote trustworthiness and address bias. Interview sessions were overtly recorded.
Participants and participant organizations were afforded confidentiality for this study. A
secured cross-reference document was developed to support the researcher's ability to organize
collected data and to allow for follow-up with participants as-needed. The cross-reference document
was protected in accordance with this research study’s data security standards.

It is important to point out, it was not possible in advance to tell where this grounded
theory research would be directed, and the questions provided in advance may not have been
sufficient to collect detail or focus on a salient, core point presented during an interview. The
intention is this line of inquiry was followed. Any deviation from IRB approved protocols would
seek out additional IRB approval before proceeding.
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Data generated from participant responses was transcribed into Atlas.ti, a qualitative data
analysis (QDA) software tool. Atlas.ti is a locally installed software package that assists
researchers in coding and organizing data. Theoretical coding, category generation, comparison
and abstraction were conducted within Atlas.ti. Research data security standards documented
within this document apply to the data generated within Atlas.ti.
Memos are another essential method employed in grounded theory. Memos are write-ups
of ideas generated during the grounded theory process (B. G. Glaser, 1998). Following
Schatzman and Strauss (Schatzman & Strauss, 1973) approach to memo writing, multiple memo
types were utilized (see table below).
Table 3 - Memoing standards (Schatzman & Strauss, 1973)
Memo Type
Function
Observational

Describe the actual events

Theoretical

Describe the researcher's thoughts about those events

Analytical

Thoughts from the data, or epiphany, reasons for codes,
categories, theoretical sampling

Methodological*

Reminders about some procedural aspect of the research

Ideas that relate to the dissertation, but are not grounded
theory related (i.e. what defines a small business,
literature review related)
* not part of Schatzman and Strauss approach, but extended by the PI for memo types
Dissertation*

Glaser (B. G. Glaser, 1978) famously stated “all is data” in grounded theory. Memos are
data; confirmed by Lempert (Lempert, 2007) as memos can be developed about earlier memos as
abstraction is raised. Memos were developed throughout the research. They provided a
chronological history of theory abstraction for retrospective investigation and support
confirmability. Additionally, the researcher was able to utilize retrospectively the thought
process and decision making from earlier parts of the research to understand how the current
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state of understanding was at that time versus the present when more information would
presumably be available. As a theory began to develop, the researcher utilized memos to review
initial participant interviews and engagements to affirm the theory’s rigor or to modify the theory
with the new insights obtained.
Memos were documented and managed within Atlas.ti. Research data security standards
documented within this document apply to the data generated within Atlas.ti.
The role of the researcher is a factor in grounded theory research. Interview sessions
position the researcher as a participant in the study. The researcher performs two roles:
participant and observer. Participation manifested in engaging in conversation through a question
and answer interview format. Observation manifested in noting situational aspects and settings.

Data Analysis
Analysis of data will be conducted throughout the project, starting early and occurring
often. This concurrent collection and analysis are an essential method of grounded theory.
Grounded theory’s purpose is to develop a theory that is grounded in the data collected from
those experiencing the process.
The grounded theory analysis process is systematic in nature. Birks and Mills (Birks &
Mills, 2015) provide an informative diagram capturing this process (see Figure 1). This threephased process begins on the bottom of the diagram with purposive sampling and works upward
through the process until theoretical integration occurs producing a grounded theory.
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Figure 1 - Essential grounded theory methods (Birks & Mills 2015)
Phase one. Essential methods in the first phase are purposive sampling, initial coding,
concurrent data collection and generation, theoretical sampling, constant comparative analysis
and category identification.
Purposive sampling. Purposive sampling provides an initial set of participant criteria
coupled with interview question direction. These initial interviews were wide in scope but
targeted at small healthcare business information security management decision related
processes. Recruitment materials designed to target small healthcare providers in South Carolina
were disseminated via LinkedIn and Twitter social media platforms. Snowballing sampling was
also be utilized following initial interview sessions, as noted above.
Initial coding. Initial coding of data was performed as data was collected. Concepts,
themes, keywords, and language from transcriptions were identified and labeled. Coding
provided a method to begin to identify patterns and areas of emphasis in the data.
Research participants responses were transcribed into Atalsti. Initial coding occurred on these
generated data.
Concurrent data generation and collection. Concurrent data generation and collection, a
key difference between grounded theory and other research methodologies, occurred throughout
all phases. Data generation and data collection are methods to produce data for analysis, but
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contrast in that data generation involves the researcher directly engaging the data source to
produce materials for analysis while data collection has little to no researcher influence on the
data source (Birks & Mills, 2015).
Theoretical sampling. Theoretical sampling provides the mechanism to focus interviews
and data collection to provide materials for comparative analysis to identify nuances of the
process, continuing to ground any emerging theoretical value. Purposive and snowball sampling
relate to the composition of the research participants in the study, however theoretical sampling
is concerned with exploring and exhausting the composition of the emerging patterns and
themes. Concepts and categories began to emerge as important or recurring. This began to direct
an emerging theory and directed where to spend more time focusing during interviews.
Constant Comparative Analysis. Rigorous comparative analysis, another essential
method of grounded theory, ensures the developed theory is valid and the path the researcher
takes to discover it is directed by the data. Furthermore, this comparative analysis reveals gaps in
the data, aspects of the process being studied that remain unexplained or unexplored (Charmaz,
2006). Participant to participant comparison were utilized as part of this method. Additionally,
codes and categories applied to participants were compared to other participants to help identify
emerging categories.
Category identification. Categories are conceptual elements in a theory (B. G. a. S.
Glaser, A.L., 1967). Charmaz (Charmaz, 2006) extends this definition by stating categories
explicate ideas, events or processes in the data, and may subsume common themes and patterns
in several codes. Birks and Mills (Birks & Mills, 2015) point out it is the grouping of codes that
“leads to the formation of categories as the researcher begins to identify explanatory, conceptual
patterns in their analysis”.
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Phase two. Existing codes defined in phase 1 direct analysis for phase 2. The methods
for analyzing data in the second phase of grounded theory, are intermediate coding, theoretical
sensitivity, core category selection and theoretical saturation.
Intermediation coding. Intermediate coding is comparing codes with codes, codes with
categories and categories with categories. Organization of codes and categories begins to occur
during comparison and relationships among them are constructed. During intermediate coding,
codes and categories may be split into more specific codes and categories and categories may
become sub-categories of an encompassing category.
Theoretical Sensitivity. Birks and Mills (Birks & Mills, 2015) define theoretical
sensitivity as the ability to recognize and extract from the data elements that have relevance for
the emerging theory. Categories from phase 1 activities began to develop themes and emerging
theories. These emerging theories were a lens to compare and analyze previous codes and
interviews to shape the emerging theory. Categories including vendor reliance, what information
security means to the business, and how responsibility is assigned all began emerging as
theoretically relevant.
Theoretical Saturation. Straus and Corbin (L. Strauss & Corbin, 1998) define theoretical
saturation as the point in category development at which no new properties, dimensions, or
relationships emerge during analysis. Saturation has occurred when a defendable theory has been
developed grounded in the data. The final interviews provided additional data points that
resonated with the developed theory.
Core Category Selection. Constructivist’s grounded theory texts define the core category
as an identified category that connects categories, subcategories and occurs frequently (Birks &
Mills, 2015). Earlier grounded theory texts put more emphasis on a core category being an
explicit category while newer research in the constructivist grounded theory epistemology
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identify a core category as the interplay between categories and subcategories that provide the
foundation for the developing theory (Charmaz, 2014). After identifying a core category and
achieving theoretical saturation, phase 3 of Birks and Mill’s (2015) model can be executed. This
phase contains the grounded theory methods of advanced coding and theoretical integration. This
research adopted Charmaz’s (2014) definition of core category, using the primary categories and
their interrelationship as the inputs to developing the theoretical ingratiation of a visual depiction
of the theory.
Phase three. The final phase of a grounded theory study is composed of advanced coding
and theoretical integration where the final theory is developed and refined.
Advanced coding. Advanced coding provides techniques for facilitating integration of the
final theory. Advanced coding identifies connections between substantive codes developed
during initial and intermediate coding. This provides an integration of the discovered data and
the abstract concepts developed by the researcher.
A common method is to use a storyline to write the developed theory (Birks & Mills,
2015). The storyline explains the theory, implicitly explaining the studied phenomena.
According to Charmaz (Charmaz, 2014) advanced coding is not a required method to
successfully complete a grounded theory study, but can be useful.
Theoretical integration. Theoretical integration is the consolidation of abstracted
theoretical data into a final grounded theory. Birks and Mills (Birks & Mills, 2015) define a
theory as an exploratory scheme comprising a set of concepts related to each other through
logical patterns of connectivity According to Strauss (Strauss, 1987) theoretical integration is the
most difficult part of a grounded theory research study.
Critical to the entire process of grounded theory, memos are created, updated and
reflected as the research goes from raw data to theoretical integration. Memos ensure
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independent review of the research and can show the analytic path taken to reach conclusions
and provide the researcher the ability to reflexively analyze work performed during the entire
project.

Ethical Considerations
There are strategic, ethical and personal issues in qualitative research when a researcher
is a participant (Locke, Spirduso, & Silverman, 2014). The researcher addressed these issues
reflexively using Creswell’s (2014) approach by describing past experiences and how they may
shape the researcher’s interpretation of the study. This is especially relevant in constructivist
grounded theory because the developed theory was not discovered as the methodology was
originally intended, but was constructed through the interpretation of the data by the researcher
(Charmaz, 2006). Therefore, the experiences and biases help shape the theory.
The researcher’s perceptions of small business information security and the healthcare
industry have been shaped by the researcher’s professional and academic experience. The
researcher has worked within the information security industry since October 2006 across
multiple industries including federal, retail, services and healthcare. This diverse experience
across multiple environments provides context of nuances for each sector. The researcher has
worked within the healthcare industry since January 2016 as a senior information security
analyst for a large healthcare provider in South Carolina. The researcher was involved in
information security strategic planning, program management and risk assessment processes as a
member of a healthcare provider information security office. The researcher has worked closely
with senior leadership across all business functions, including compliance, finance, procurement,
infrastructure and architecture.
The researcher believed the knowledge obtained through the researcher’s professional
and academic experience in the information security field coupled with the sensitivity the
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researcher has developed for the healthcare industry prepared the researcher with a contextual
understanding of challenges and issues that may affect this demographic. However, the
researcher has never worked specifically with SHPOs.
The researcher allowed the participants to shape the narrative of what the process was
under study. The researcher experience was directly related to this area of study that makes
researcher bias unavoidable. Every intention was made to be objective in collection and analysis,
but it was the interpretation from the researcher's perspective that ultimately constructed the
theory that was grounded in the data (Charmaz, 2000). Researchers’ assumptions are captured in
the assumptions section. Collected data and its objective grounding were closely monitored if
developing codes, categories, and theories began to support the assumptions identified prior to
the research effort.
Internal, sensitive or incriminating information may be disclosed during the research
activity that could cause harm to the research participant personally or to the organization the
research participant represents. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the researcher to instill trust
and implement confidentiality processes to protect the participant. The researcher also explicitly
informed participants not to disclose any known cyber incident experienced by the participant
organization.
Multiple techniques were employed to address these ethical considerations, convey trust
and promote full, honest responses. IRB approval was sought prior to collecting any data. All
research participants were required to read and acknowledge an informed consent form that
clearly communicated their rights and expectations to privacy as a participant in the study.
Participants and their organization were de-identified. A mapping tool identifying participants
and organizations with their unique study identifier was maintained but with strict access
controls and data at rest encryption. All data was protected in accordance with the research data
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management plan. Where applicable, participants were afforded the opportunity to review,
clarify and provide corrections on summaries of themes and codes from their interview session.
The researcher would enter into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) with research
participants if the research participant organization required it. This assumed the NDA did not
prevent any aspect of the data collection, analysis or findings disclosure.
The researcher utilized a defer technique when a research participant inquired the
interviewer about the interviewer’s views on a topic. For example, if a research participant were
to ask, “what should I know about the HIPAA security rule”. The researcher would reply “I do
not want to influence your responses. I’ll be happy to discuss upon the conclusion of this
research study”, to avoid researcher and participant bias.

Research Trustworthiness
The reliability and validity of this qualitative research findings are dependent on the rigor
applied to the research design to ensure trustworthiness of the findings. Much research has been
performed in the area of defining constructs and provisions to ensure trustworthiness (Guba,
1981; Lakshmi & Mohideen, 2013; Shenton, 2004; Sikolia, Biros, Mason, & Weiser, 2013),
(Marshall & Rossman, 2014; Maxwell, 1992).
Lakshmi and Mohideen (Lakshmi & Mohideen, 2013) provide a definition of internal and
external validity. Internal validity encompasses whether the results of the study are legitimate
because of the way the groups were selected, data was recorded, or analysis performed. External
validity, often called "generalizability", involves whether the results given by the study are
transferable to other groups (i.e. populations) of interest.
Qualitative research requires trustworthiness through validity and reliability to support
the credibility of the research (Golafshani, 2003). Validity and reliability are achieved through
multiple criteria. Guba’s (Guba, 1981) four criteria for assessing trustworthiness are credibility,
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transferability, dependability and confirmability. Sikolia et al. (Sikolia et al., 2013) focuses these
four criteria to the realm of grounded theory research. Relative to this research, the criteria
addressed below uses Sikolia et al.’s (2013) identified steps to improve trustworthiness across
these dimensions:
Credibility. Credibility refers to the accuracy with which collected data matches the
multiple realities of the phenomena being studied and aligns with internal validity (Sikolia et al.,
2013). Credibility of this research is addressed below in the internal validity section, using
Maxwell’s (Maxwell, 1992) sub-categories of internal validity to support the methods employed
to ensure internal validity and credibility.
Transferability. Transferability refers to the applicability of one set of findings to
another setting and aligns to external validity (Sikolia et al., 2013). Grounded theory uses
concurrent data collection and analysis. As abstraction occurs and a theory begins to emerge,
previously collected data is compared to the developing theory to disprove aspects of the theory
or refine the theory. Once theoretical saturation occurs, the transferability of the research is
strengthened.
Exhaustive detail of this research in a dissertation format and the documentation of
supporting memos from the study supports transferability. These artifacts will be available upon
request to any researcher wishing to understand, dispute or reproduce this work.
The final report includes methods used for data generation and collection, analysis
techniques performed and abstraction efforts. Individual and organizational participants were not
disclosed as part of this external validity activity due to privacy and agreed upon conventions
with research participants.
Dependability. Dependability refers to the accuracy that the collected data represents the
changing phenomena over time and is consistent over time, researcher and analysis techniques,
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and aligns to reliability (Sikolia et al., 2013). Memos were documented to record researcher
interpretations, research progress, participant interactions and other research related activities.
These memos provided an account of the progress and path taken from raw data collection to
grounded theory creation (Charmaz, 2014). Providing a historical account of the research
progress strengthens dependability (Sikolia et al., 2013).
Confirmability. Confirmability refers to the objectivity of the research and the ability for
another researcher to confirm the same findings presented with the same data set. Similar to
dependability, memos providing a rich historical account of the researches progress will be
recorded and available with the research findings. This account provides to any outside
researcher the complete context and steps this researcher processed through for repeatability or
validation.
Further supporting qualitative research trustworthiness, Maxwell (Maxwell, 1992)
provides five validity criteria to consider in this research paradigm as identified in the credibility
aspect. They are descriptive, interpretive, theoretical, evaluative validity and generalizability.
Maxwell points out evaluative validity is not central to qualitative research and the basis of this
research is grounded entirely in the data. This research makes no claim to evaluate the things
studied to strengthen evaluative validity. Relative to this research, the criteria for the remaining
four aspects is addressed below:
Descriptive Validity. Maxwell (Maxwell, 1992) identifies this validity attribute as the
most important aspect of validity in a qualitative study because all other validity aspects are
dependent on the descriptive validity. Descriptive validity is the factual accuracy of the data to
ensure the accounts of interviews and observations are not distorted or falsified. Descriptive
validity is concerned with physical or behavioral events rather than their meaning to the
participants (Kaplan, 1964).
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Interviews were audio-recorded by the researcher. This ensured the ability to validate the
accuracy of transcription. Upon completion of transcription, a review was executed to verify the
transcription is consistent with the interview.
Interpretive Validity. This research studies the experiences of the subjects participating
in the studied processes. Interpretive accounts are grounded in the language of the people studied
and rely as much as possible on their own words and concepts (Maxwell, 1992). Interpretive
validity does not only apply to the conscious concepts of a participants, but can pertain to
unconscious intentions, beliefs, concepts and values (Maxwell, 1992).
Contributing to the credibility dimension of trustworthiness in grounded theory, Sikolia et
al. (Sikolia et al., 2013) identifies techniques from the literature to promote interpretive validity
utilized in the research including directing inquiry to expand on emerging theory and using
participants language in the emerging theory.
Theoretical Validity. Maxwell (Maxwell, 1992) identifies two major attributes of
theoretical understanding. The first is the degree of abstraction from the actual studied
phenomena. The second is the interpretation of the participants account as an explanation. He
points out that theoretical validity is applying a theoretical construct to support explaining a
relationship among concepts being studied. While he states theoretical validity “depends on
whether there is a consensus in the community concerned with research about the terms used to
describe the phenomena”, grounded theory looks to define a theory based on data collected from
participants involved with the studied phenomena. As research progresses and theoretical
abstraction occurs, theoretical sensitivity will be employed to direct interviews and research
participants will define the concepts being identified and will accept or reject the relationships as
they begin to emerge.
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Generalizability. Generalizability refers to the extent an account of a situation can be
applied to other settings and population (Maxwell, 1992). A requirement of grounded theory is
theoretical saturation. Theoretical saturation is the situation where additional data collected does
not add to or refute any part of the developed theory (Birks & Mills, 2015). Theoretical
saturation therefore indicates for a population of a similar demographic the theory would be
applicable, and therefore generalizable. Extending the theory to other populations where
variables of the demographic are changed to test the applicability of the theory is left as future
work.
Provisions developed by Shenton (Shenton, 2004) provide techniques to strengthen
qualitative research internal validity. Several of these provisions were implemented in this
research study. These provisions and the applicable to this research are:
•

Adoption of well-established research methods (i.e. grounded theory)

•

Data triangulation - This research intended to interview at least nine participants. Any
data that drives theory will be from multiple sources. Triangulation is defined as “a
validity procedure where researchers search for convergence among multiple and
different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study” (Cresswell &
Miller, 2000).

•

Honesty from respondents - Addressed in participant, site and sampling section of this
chapter

•

Negative case analysis – Grounded theory does this by the nature of its approach to refine
the developing theory and concurrently apply collected data to it to ensure
appropriateness.
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Thick descriptions of experienced phenomena - Charmaz’s (2014) approach to grounded
theory uses action verbs in all coding and categories to promote thick descriptions and
provide narrative capabilities to theories as they emerge.

•

Researcher background and bias disclosure - The researcher’s relevant background and
experience are documented in this research design. Researcher assumptions and the role
of the researcher have been documented above. Efforts to limit researcher bias were
explicitly utilized.

•

Frequent debriefing sessions - This research is part of a dissertation project, therefore the
PI has a chair monitoring and supervising all research activities. Throughout the research
process the chair was debriefed and had the opportunity to inject comments and concerns
to avoid issues with trustworthiness.

•

Reflective commentary - Grounded theory uses memos as a foundational element of the
research design. These memos are created throughout the research process and provide
the capability for reflection on thought processes, findings and research process for all
elements of the research study.

Participant and Research Bias
Interviews between a researcher and participants constitute a major component of
collected data. Considerations related to the researcher and the participant must be addressed to
mitigate the suspicion of the research findings appropriateness. These considerations and their
corresponding mitigations are listed:
Participant error. Participant error are factors that adversely impact how a participant
performs. This could result from a participant being interviewed while their boss is in the room
and wanting to not answer honestly or completely. This risk was mitigated with multiple
techniques. First the researcher ensured only those participants that are accountable for
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information security at the participant organization are involved during the interview session.
Secondly, the participants had an opportunity to review and verify responses for accuracy. This
follow up provides an opportunity for the participant to correct or expand on any responses.
Participant Bias. Participant bias is any factor that produces false data. Participants may
not be truthful in their responses for multiple reasons including providing responses they believe
to be desirable to the researcher or socially acceptable. The researcher mitigated this risk by
ensuring effective communication to participants of the purpose of the study, the necessity of full
and truthful responses, the anonymity of the participants involvement in the study, and
confidentiality being applied to their responses.
Researcher Error. Researcher error is any factor that alters the researcher’s
interpretation of the data. Validity aspects of the research study were utilized to limit researcher
error. Additionally, memos were recorded throughout the entire study to provide a chronological
history of research progress and theory development.
Researcher Bias. Researcher bias is the influence on a study based on the researcher’s
assumptions or desire for the study’s results. Researcher bias was a legitimate risk that was
addressed to maintain trustworthiness of the study findings based on the researchers experience
in the information security field and the healthcare industry.
The research study’s PI worked for a medical university within the state of South
Carolina, effectively a competitor to participants businesses. Two approaches were incorporated
into the research design to address potential conflict of interest and introduction of researcher
bias. These approaches were:
•

Verbal informed consent disclosed this association to research participants.

•

Research participants were provided aggregated, anonymized data of the research
findings upon conclusion of the research.
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These activities were designed to avoid any conflict of interest or scrutiny over the validity
and reliability of the results from this study.

Assumptions
Assumptions the researcher had about what may be discovered during the study or what
factors are influencing information security program management decisions are documented in
the research design. The PI had no prior experience with SHPOs and therefore brought no
assumptions of findings into the research.
The following lists researcher assumptions:
1. Small business health care providers are aware of HIPAA
2. Small businesses are aware of the necessity of implementing security controls but due to
a lack of understanding on how to implement or a lack of understanding on the scope of
threat vectors, choose not to implement.
3. Availability is the primary security objective of interest to small business health care
providers.
4. Healthcare providers recognize HIPAA as applicable legislation, but value it as ‘not
having teeth’ and therefore do not feel compelled or motivated to comply.
5. The experience of a cyber-attack on an organization makes the hypothetical a reality and
shifts attitude of information security control priority to a small business.
6. Small businesses believe they are too small a target to cyber criminals to be targeted.
Any findings that align with predisposed assumptions were validated with additional
rigor to verify the applicability of the finding.
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Limitations
The definition of small within the context of SHPO is a limitation elected by the
researcher. There is currently limited research on small healthcare providers and there is no
consensus-based, accepted definition for healthcare provider organization sizes. Healthcare
providers organization size are measured multiple ways depending on the organization or
research group measuring them. SBA bases size on generated revenue, dependent on businesstype as defined by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Healthcare
providers, specifically “Offices of Physicians (except Mental Health Specialists) NAICS Code:
621111” are considered small if they generate less than $11M annually (SBA, 2018). It is not
unreasonable to consider a 10-physician healthcare provider in a very affluent region, offering
very expensive procedures to exceed $11M annually. This would exclude them as a SHPO,
despite their staff size.
The American Medical Association (Kane, 2017) conducted research and found that
more than half of all healthcare providers in the United States have 10 or less physicians on staff.
This quantified value represents a majority of healthcare providers in the United States and is a
staff headcount consistent with an organization that would be in the target demographic.
Therefore 10 physicians or fewer on staff was defined as part of the demographic requirement
for in-scope research participant organizations.
The PI lived in Charleston, SC. Limiting research participants location to South Carolina
was a geographical limitation of the researcher’s ability to reasonably conduct research.

Chapter Summary
This chapter documents the research protocol for this study. It presents a detailed
description of the population to be included in the research, the methods to collect and generate
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data, and the methods for analysis documented. Research findings aligned to the identified
processes.
The research approach utilized interviews, focus groups, memo writing, concurrent data
generation and analysis as methods to develop raw data. The PI was positioned as a participant in
the research, conducting unstructured interviews initially and transitioning into semi-structured
interviews after thematic categories begin to develop from initial and intermediate coding
activities, allowing individuals to share their views. The immersion into the setting of the
participant and the open-ended approach to interview questions provided participants unfettered
opportunity to express subjective meaning of their experiences (Crotty, 1998).
There was little research on information security at SHPO, requiring exploratory
research. Grounded theory is a suitable research methodology for exploratory research designs.
This research has a defined research participant population and setting for conducting the
interviews, the primarily employed research method. Grounded theory provides systematic data
analysis procedures that were executed to process through the grounded theory methodology.
Research trustworthiness, ethical considerations and biases were accounted for and were
documented to provide rigor to the final research deliverable.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Introduction
This qualitative research studies factors affecting cyber security decisions at SHPOs in
South Carolina. Grounded theory techniques were utilized to inductively develop a theory
explaining the operational processes associated with these decisions and why these organization
types have challenges securing their assets.
This exploratory research provided visibility into an area currently with little literature.
Additionally, it can facilitate additional informed research for SHPOs.
This chapter presents the key findings from nine intensive interviews with personnel accountable
for information security at their organization. The key findings interrelationship is discussed to
support the theory generated from the grounded theory methodology.
First the composition and execution of the research is presented. This includes details on
research participants, operational execution of the research, and the evolution of the coding
activities during research. Next six key findings are presented that directly support and interrelate
with the developed theory. Following this, the developed theory is presented and explained in
totality. This chapter ends with discussion of the theory and key findings.
Further promoting confidentiality, any reference to third-party vendors in this report are
replaced by fictitious company names based on the Greek alphabet (i.e. Alpha, Beta).

Methods
Research Participants. IRB approval was required for this research due to the inclusion
of human subjects. Dakota State University IRB reviewed this research protocol and determined
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the best course of action would be for the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) IRB to
provide this function. IRB approval was issued by MUSC for this research. IRB approval can be
referenced in Appendix C.
An IRB approved social media marketing campaign was initially used for participant
solicitation. Additionally, the researcher contacted the president of the South Carolina Medical
Group Management Association (SCMGMA), a professional association composed of healthcare
practices from across South Carolina (SCMGMA, 2019). This is an ideal association to identify
in-scope participants. The PI engaged leadership at SCMGMA to share the research study and
act as a medium for soliciting their members as research participants. Six of the research
participants were either directly acquired through this organization or from snowball sampling
from a participant initially identified through SCMGMA.
There were fourteen candidates that were engaged for participation (see Table 4). There
were nine research participants interviewed for this study. Some participants were from the same
city, but the population represented a diversity of areas within South Carolina. Furthermore, the
participants represented a range of healthcare provider organization types including, but not
limited to, pain management specialists, dermatology, and surgical practices.
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The state of South Carolina is geographically divided into four regions: Upstate,
Midlands, Lowcountry, and Pee Dee. The figure below from SCDHEC illustrates the allocation
of these regions (SCDHEC, 2019). The participant table below includes the region of each
participant.

Figure 2 - South Carolina regions
The following table provides demographic data of the information security responsible
personnel (IRP) participant population and assigned pseudonyms. Unexpectedly multiple
candidates spoke with me during recruitment and were interested in participating. However, they
did not attend the interview during our scheduled window and failed to ever respond to further
communication.
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ID Name
IRP Role
SHPO Type
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SC Region

Status

Pee Dee

Expressed interest to
referring participant
(snowballing) on
multiple occasions;
Unable to establish
communication to
recruit.

Family Medicine

Pee Dee

Initially believed to
meet participant
criteria, but had more
than 10 providers.

Practice
Pain Management
Administrator

Midlands

Study Participant

"PR1"

Practicing
Physician

2

"PR2"

Director of
Operations

3

"PR3"

4

"PR4"

Practice
Manager

Pain Management

Pee Dee

Did not attend
interview. Ceased
communication.

5

"PR5"

Practicing
Physician

Rhinoplasty

Lowcountry

Study Participant

6

"PR6"

Managing
Director

Polysomnography

Pee Dee

Study Participant

7

"PR7"

Practice
Administrator

Dermatology

Midlands

Study Participant

8

"PR8"

Practicing
Physician

Anesthesiology

Lowcountry

Study Participant

9

"PR9"

CFO

Oncology

Lowcountry

Study Participant

10

"PR10"

Practice
Administrator

Dermatology

Lowcountry

Study Participant

11

"PR11"

Practice
Administrator

Dental

Lowcountry

Did not attend
interview. Ceased
communication.

12

"PR12"

Practice
Administrator

General Surgery

Pee Dee

Study Participant

Pee Dee

Expressed interest to
participate. During
scheduling, ceased
communication.

1

13

"PR13"

Manager

Otolaryngology

Dermatology
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ID

Name

IRP Role

SHPO Type

SC Region

Status

14

"PR14"

Practice
Manager

Clinic

Lowcountry

Study Participant

Upstate

Expressed interest to
participate. During
scheduling, ceased
communication.

15 “PR15”

Practicing
Physician

Anesthesiology

Research Execution. All interviews were executed in accordance with IRB
requirements. All interviews were conducted over the phone via a WebEx connection and lasted
between 45-60 minutes. The ability to conduct a “face-to-face” video teleconference was offered
and only one participant elected to participate. All other interviews were audio only. All
interviews were recorded, and the participants were aware and agreed to being recorded.
Every interview began with a preamble to ensure participant rights and awareness. This
preamble was IRB approved. The preamble was:
Thank you for your time and speaking with me. I am a doctoral candidate. I
currently work at the Medical University of South Carolina, researching small
business healthcare cybersecurity decision processes. I would like to talk in
generalities to get an understanding of the types of security issues you may face.
I do not want to know explicitly if your company has had a successful breach or
experienced a successful cyber-attack.
The information provided will remain strictly confidential and you will
not be identified by your answers. You and your company’s name will not be
disclosed in any way. Data will be compiled with no individual responses tied to
your name or any identifying information about you. I would like to record this
interview. All information disclosed during our conversation will be kept in a
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secure location. You may choose not to answer any question. Do you have any
questions before we get started? Are you willing to participate?
I will begin recording this interview session now.
A semi-structured interview protocol was utilized to manage the interview. The interview
guide, Appendix B, had ice breaker questions, information security program questions, ending
questions, and probes to elicit more information. Information security program questions were
focused on threats, financial factors, regulatory influences, and decision-making processes. If a
participant mentioned an item that was an emerging concept, based on coding practices, probes
were used to explore this topic further.
Completed recordings were transcribed and imported into Atlas.ti, a qualitative data
analysis tool. Analysis began immediately following the import of the first interview. Analysis
continued throughout entire research execution.
Coding. Coding provides a method to begin to identify patterns and areas of emphasis in
the data. Concepts, themes, keywords, and language from transcriptions are identified and
labeled. Initial coding covered a large area of topics. Several codes identified initially did not
persist through research analysis. Codes that did not persist were either absorbed into like codes
that captured the essence of the concept or were isolated codes that were interesting but did not
support or resonate with emerging categories.
The researcher began comparing and contrasting the codes themselves after initial coding
the first 4 interviews. There were over 100 codes at this phase of analysis. Reviewing codes and
abstracting them with regards to what the code was referring to or a property of resulted in the
emergence of categories. These categories, called code groups in Atlas.ti, served as logical
grouping of codes. This further allowed for analysis and logical thinking of what was happening
in the data. Subsequent interviews followed the same protocol, but areas of emergence would be
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further probed for properties and dimensions from the participant if they surfaced during the
interview.
Codes were compared to codes to determine if they were different codes, but
conceptually the same. If they were conceptually identical, the codes were merged. An example
of this was “hacker as a threat” and “fear of someone out there on the Internet attacking us”
being merged to “hacker as a threat”.
Codes were compared to concepts, concepts to categories, categories to categories,
concepts to concepts to promote abstraction of concepts and understand relationships among
these pieces as the coding process progressed.
The activity of coding interviews then comparing and contrasting codes to codes and
codes to categories happened several times throughout the research. As coding continued several
thematic areas began to emerge. Grounded theory seeks a core category to allow for further
analysis to refine and illuminate. The core category is the relationship and propagated
assumptions SHPOs have about their IT providers coupled with the organizations narrow
concept of what comprises information security.
Codes and categories were revisited to analyze their property or value with respect to this
core category. Following the identification of the core category, codes that did not relate were
disregarded during further analysis. Previously coded interviews were revisited following core
category to identify data that relates. This was a useful activity as each time reviewing transcripts
with a different perspective or focus resulted in “seeing” more relevant data points.
At the completion of the research there were 136 codes and 17 categories. These codes
and categories can be referenced in Appendix D.
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Findings
A data summary table, Appendix G was constructed based on Bloomberg and Volpe
(Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012) with emergent categories that provided dimension to the core
category. The descriptors were: risk-based program, security seen as privacy, Trust IT vendor
with security, reliance on vendor, risk analysis performed, self-confidence in security program
effectiveness, support for HIPAA, support for operating in a secure and compliant manner. These
descriptors drove the findings documented below. Based on these findings, a theory was
developed that explains why information security at SHPOs has limited effectiveness despite
internal and external factors.
The final three interviews utilized the same interview guide used as previous interviews.
However, as theoretically relevant topics would come up, such as the reliance and trust of the
vendor, the participants perspective of how security related to privacy, and the execution of risk
analysis activities were all further discussed to support theoretical sensitivity and saturation.
Six major findings that directly support the constructed theory emerged from the study.
These findings are:
1. Limited IT and information security knowledge - An overwhelming majority of
participants (7/9 or 78%) self-identify as having limited understanding of IT and
information security.
2. IT vendor trust and reliance - An overwhelming majority of participants (7/9 or 78%)
trust and are reliant on their IT vendors explicitly for IT knowledge and expertise and
implicitly for information security knowledge and expertise.
3. Assuming IT vendors provide security - A majority of participants assume security (6/9
or 67%) is inclusively part of IT and therefore is provided by their IT vendor.
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4. Narrow definition of security - A significant number of participants (5/9 or 56%) have a
narrow view of information security, seeing it as a privacy or confidentiality activity
only.
5. Information security program confidence – Nearly all participants (8/9 or 89%) are
confident in the effectiveness of their currently constituted information security program
and have internal drive to invest and add controls to reduce risk to acceptable levels.
6. IT is outsourced – Nearly all participants (8/9 or 89%) outsource their IT operations.
The following provides supporting data for these findings. The utilized research
methodology employed intensive interviews from participants living the experiences. Quotations
from the participants are utilized to illustrate the nuances of the findings. Specific quotations are
not selected because they best make the case for the finding (i.e. “cherry-picking”) but are
selected to represent the attitude of the participant population relative to the finding.
Finding 1. An overwhelming majority of participants (7/9 or 78%) self-identify as
having limited understanding of IT and information security. Several participants explicitly
shared this admission and others implicitly did through describing their reliance on their
outsourced IT vendors to support their business and business decisions. None of the participants
responsible for information security at the businesses were acting in an IT role or had an IT
education related background. Many saw the inclusion of IT as a necessity for operating their
business.
Many participants shared varying responses about their knowledge base of IT and
information security, all which indicated a gap. PR12 described her knowledge with technology
specifically as: “I’m not good with technology. I mean, I put up with it because we have to do it”
(PR12).
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The individual responsible is often times a business manager and administrator who
“owns” the responsibility despite the gap in knowledge. This results in guessing best course of
action. PR7 shared her responses when staff members approach her about rules on interorganizational communication of PHI:
I’m not an IT expert so I have to make the best decisions that I can and
sometimes it’s more on the safe side even though it might be okay I just say
maybe don’t do that until I have further information on how to do that
appropriately. I’d rather be safe than sorry. (PR7)
Most participants have not sought additional information security education to make
better decisions, but rather relied entirely upon their IT vendor. Some participants commented
hearing about information security related events from the news or colleagues, but this is only
incidental. PR9 shared on what information he uses to stay informed on information security: “I
keep up with, you know—every now and then I’ll read newsletters just enough to be dangerous
and get scared with the cyber security and all of the breaches that are out there” (PR9).
Multiple participants commented on the rate that technology evolves exceeds their ability
to gain knowledge in it. This factor promotes the persistence of these individuals having limited
IT knowledge. Participants indicated they have several areas of responsibility that makes
maintaining an understanding of IT and information security very difficult. PR7’s comments
illustrate this reality when asked if information security was not a priority at her business:
I maybe a little bit yeah I would say but not intentionally not a priority not that
I know it’s a risk but I’m going to kick it to the bottom of the list but I think
the physicians have a lot on their plate and I guess it’s my job to worry about
that and figure out how to make sure’s safe and secure and all that.
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I handle a lot of different areas it’s hard to be an expert in every single
area I got to be an expert in the financial side of it in using our bookkeeping
software and speaking with the accountants and making sure we’re on the up
and up about with their bookkeeping software and our taxes in the way I’m
processing payroll and paying our physicians and then I have to worry about
the operational side is my clinic functioning properly are we efficient. Am I,
you know that I have to worry about the customer service part of it are my
patients happy are we training in retraining our front desk employees about
how to handle tough situations with patients and get them what they need.
Then I’m worried about speaking with my attorneys and thinking about
legal risk and then there’s the cyber part I think it’s difficult to be an expert in
every area’s and think about all the stuff and I think with the cyber part of it is
that a changes and evolves so much faster then anything else that it’s difficult
to keep up with that also (PR7)
Multiple participants shared comments at the end of interviews that the activity of the
interview resulted in an increase in knowledge about information security. Specifically, one
participant stated: “Doing this discussion with you has certainly helped me to think about that
collect my thoughts on that” (PR5). Another participant shared specifically: “No, you have asked
some good questions made me think about things and how we do things” (PR6). Another
commented:
Yeah I guess there are several things that I haven’t sat and talked about cyber
security this long in my role maybe ever, but yeah I think you are making me
think about it harder than I did before and what I need to do about it. I think
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I’ve been a little bit more reactive to things then more proactive it is a big deal
but yeah I don’t think I’ve ever talked or thought about it this long or hard so.
(PR7)
The finding of limited IT and information security knowledge for IRP supports Finding 2.
Finding 2. An overwhelming majority of participants (7/9 or 78%) trust and are reliant
on their IT vendors explicitly for IT knowledge and expertise and implicitly for information
security knowledge and expertise. One participant that this finding did not apply to was fully “on
paper” and did not utilize IT as typically seen in today’s SHPOs. Detailed in Finding 6 below, no
participant businesses had in-house IT staff; nearly all outsourced their IT business needs, except
one with no IT. Particularly given the limited IT knowledge of respondents, the amount of trust
and reliance on the IT vendor is significant. Indeed, all participants conveyed their reliance on
their IT vendor in their business operations. In fact, one participant shared that since the IT
vendor handles security, the business therefore implicitly trusts the vendor to implement
effective information security controls at their practice: “Again the IT firm handles that, so I trust
them. They know to what degree we need to be protected” (PR6). This trust and reliance were
not founded on contractual protections or described thoroughness of the IT vendor’s approach to
information security but rather on the IT vendor’s positive reputation within the local business
community.
In addition, several participants shared their business need to rely on their IT vendors
because of their own limited knowledge and broad scope and priority of the participant’s
responsibilities. PR12 commented:
That’s my responsibility here in the office: to make sure that things run
smoothly within the office. When it comes to technology and cyber security I
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have to—because I’m not familiar with it I have to rely on companies like
Alpha and Beta that they’re doing their job. (PR12)
PR12 later in the interview made a comment that indicated her reliance on their
IT vendors was an appealing relationship: “We don’t want to be thinking about
technology. We just want to know that our technology’s working, that the patients are
safe” (PR12).
PR7’s comments echoed many participants, further supported by finding one: “But I
guess it was my background in healthcare administrations. I rely heavily on my vendors to help
me make sure my stuff is safe”. (PR7)
Further developed in Finding 3, IT vendors are not only trusted and relied upon for IT but
also information security. PR9 commented:
I generally rely on my IT guy here that I really trust. I usually ask him, if he
suggests a particular mitigation strategy, to give me a couple of vendors and
the pluses and minuses of both as well as the cost of each, and then we move
forward based on that information. (PR9)
When further questioned as to why IT vendors are trusted and relied upon for security,
many participants indicated this was simply “trust,” transitively extending positive experiences
and reputation in IT to provide security services. Perhaps IT vendors reinforce this trust by
“talking security” to practice’s representative, who unfortunately has limited knowledge of the
topic. Therefore, the IT vendor may legitimize their position as knowledgeable, reliant, and
trustworthy despite their actual information security knowledge level. PR9’s comments directly
above were followed up with the question “why do you trust the vendor?” PR9 stated: “You
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know, it’s hard to put your finger on it, but sometimes you can just talk to somebody and just
realize that they know what they’re doing” (PR9).
The implicit trust extended to IT vendors was often seen as an assumption of acceptable
levels of execution. PR5 commented on how cyber security factored into his decision on trusting
a vendor:
I guess there were a couple decisions. Did they seem legitimate company, it
wasn’t something a little bit shady and I had questions, so I kind of put that
trust in there that they were going to follow through with whatever the standard
for information technology and security and just trust that was there to start
with, for me personally I don’t know the specifics and ins and outs that would
be done on a technical level. So, I wasn’t really interested in asking those
questions to make comparisons, for me it was more about the product itself.
(PR5)
All participants are forced to extend some level of trust to third party vendors since they
outsource their IT operations. Trust and reliance seem tightly coupled for the participants with
respect to their IT vendors. Furthermore, it seems the greater the general reliance the greater
degree of trust about information security is required. While a majority of participants indicated
they collaborate on information security decisions with their IT vendor, they acknowledged that
the IT vendor was the driver of the decision itself.
Finding 3. A majority of participants (6/9 or 67%) assumed information security to be
part of IT and therefore provided by their IT vendor. The IRP’s limited knowledge of IT and
information security fosters the trust and reliance in their IT vendor. This extends the perceived
scope of the IT vendor’s service offering to include security.
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It was unknown by most participants if contractual language with IT vendors included
explicit terms for security related services. IT vendors are providing and maintaining technology
(i.e. workstations, servers, printers, network devices) that most often have some security controls
fundamentally incorporated. For example, it is fairly standard for any modern workstation to
require a username and password to login to the computer, and also for critical applications to be
user-specific password protected. This is an information security control and one that an IT
vendor would be associated with from a participant’s perspective. This results in participants
making the association of their IT vendor with information security as a general fact, despite the
fact that information security extends beyond IT to include operational and administrative
controls.
One participant comment concisely echoed many of the participants position: “Again the
IT firm handles that, so I trust them. They know to what degree we need to be protected” (PR6).
While PR6 stated he collaborated with his IT vendor on information security related decisions,
he made multiple comments suggesting the collaboration was more of a governance role.
Strengthening this commonality, PR7 shared “...from our cyber security in general I rely a lot on
my IT vendor…” (PR7).
Another participant’s comments clearly demonstrated the implicit extension of security to
the IT vendor. When asked how cyber security related investment decisions are made and what
evidence or metrics are leveraged to inform that decision, PR9 shared:
I generally rely on my IT guy here that I really trust. I usually ask him, if he
suggests a particular mitigation strategy, to give me a couple of vendors and
the pluses and minuses of both as well as the cost of each, and then we move
forward based on that information. (PR9)
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The IRP’s limited knowledge of IT and information security fosters the trust and reliance
in their IT vendor. This extends the perceived scope of the IT vendor’s service offering to
include security.
Finding 4. A significant number of participants (5/9 or 56%) have a narrow view of
information security, seeing it as a privacy or confidentiality activity only. A majority of
participants had a primary cyber security concern of suffering a data breach and their focus for
security control was around protecting the confidentiality of PHI, often referred to
interchangeably by participants as patient information.
Participants responded in different ways about their cyber security concerns, but the
majority were concerned with a patient privacy breach and compromise of confidentiality. PR9
discussed his fear with physicians at his practice losing their mobile phone because (against
policy) they text patient information and this could result in a breach. PR12 discussed her
concerns of having patient information on a display or print out, face up on desk and being seen
by unauthorized parties. PR7 put it plainly when asked her primary concern from a cybersecurity
perspective: “Primarily I am always worried about my patient’s information” (PR7).
Interpretation of HIPAA by the participants demonstrated it was viewed as regulation to
promote privacy and confidentiality of PHI. This further supports the motivation of the practices
to seek out controls to promote confidentiality. HIPAA has both a security rule and a privacy
rule. Based on participant responses, the security rule has the goal of achieving and maintaining
confidentiality in support of the privacy rule. PR5 shared his thoughts on HIPAA that
demonstrates the scoping of his interpretation of the legislation:
There are things that I guess are sort of these rules that have to be followed or
penalties for not following those, that seem maybe not strict but the potential
harm in having that information get out into the wrong hands is really
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significant. And I do believe personal health information is very something
that is critically important to protect. It’s something that should be private and
should be held private especially as technology evolves over the years it
becomes very hard to kind of keep up with all that. (PR5)
Some participants discussed protected staff information and financial information as
assets to secure, but patient information was regularly referenced by participants as the critical
asset requiring security.
Finding 5. Nearly all participants (8/9 or 89%) are confident in the effectiveness of their
currently constituted information security program. This was an unexpected finding given that
research suggests healthcare businesses identify as having shortcomings in information security
posture (Institute, 2016; Martin, Martin, Hankin, Darzi, & Kinross, 2017).
Many participants believe their initial and continuing information security controls and
posture are adequate. Participants (6/9 or 67%) stated they would make changes as needed but in
more of a reactive manner than proactive manner, or to say it bluntly, nothing bad has happened
that they are aware of so their information security must be appropriate. PR12 commented:
Cyber security doesn’t really come around here. that’s why it’s so—it’s kind of
weird. Because I’m like yeah, we really don’t think about that. I mean, we did.
We have everything in place. I’m sure changes are going to happen, you know,
but they don’t happen like instantly. Something needs to happen it’ll happen….
Now, if the computers are running slow or if we feel like somebody hacked,
that’s when, you know, we start thinking about oh, shoot, something’s
happening, you know, we need to get in touch with our IT department or, you
know, cyber, you know, security and stuff like that. But we don’t really—it’s
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not something that we think about. Now, maybe because we’re confident that
we are safe. (PR12)
Finding 3 justifies this finding in that participant organizations are viewing the scope of
their IT vendors responsibility to include security. The IRP accepts security is properly addressed
through their IT vendor, whom has established the IRP’s trust and reliance (Finding 2).
Therefore, the IRP feels confident in the information security posture.
When discussing with PR6, who stated his IT vendor handles information security, what
the frequency for meeting and discussing information security was between the IRP and the IT
vendor, it was revealed that security was initially technically implemented and normal operating
practices were to hold security related meetings in an ad hoc reactive nature to incidents.
Yes, it's more ad hoc as needed most of the time when we have conversations
it’s because maybe the Internet you know there's a problem with one of the
servers or something not the server maybe one of the backups, somethings
wrong with it. Or we have, we use software that does diagnostic testing
sometimes it's problems with that that we have to work out those problems can
pop up about anytime but with our firm though they have a firm grasp on what
we need and what we expect and they're very good at taking care of our needs
so it’s the security part is not one that comes up a lot because we have the
understanding that we need to do whatever it takes to make sure we're secure. I
think, again I lean heavily on them to make sure we, everything is good I have
confidence that they follow the best practice. (PR6)
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Based on PR6’s responses, the ad hoc services are related to traditional IT functions (i.e.
break/fix) and less information security risk management. This underlines likely misplaced
confidence in the program while highlighting why the misunderstood perception would be made.
Some participants were confident in their current security program while contradictorily
stating they knew of gaps in their security and areas of improvement but choosing not to take
action to mitigate. Specifically, when asked about his practice’s security control effectiveness
PR5 stated:
I think they are effective, they are fairly effective in practice, but there are
things that could certainly be improved upon for sure that probably the most
succinct way to answer that. Like I said we haven’t had any issues, or at least
nothing I’m aware of and I would assume if there were anything of
consequence or significance that would have had showed itself.
I know we have the most basic things in place, I feel comfortable with
that. But there are certainly weak points or points where we may not be
following exactly the right protocols or things like that that need to be
improved upon. I wouldn’t say it isn’t perfect, certainly. I don’t think you can
ever say anything is perfect because it needs to evolve, but I wouldn’t say the
security protocols are great. I would say they are good, they have been
effective and are currently effective the way we are using them but certainly
need to be reviewed and improved upon. Even if I didn’t think that now, I
would at least from time to time, whether its annually or whenever, there’s an
importance to looking at that more routinely. (PR5)
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Two participants were confident in their security program’s effectiveness while
acknowledging there was room for growth.
Finding 6. Nearly all participants (8/9 or 89%) outsource their IT operations. This
includes IT professional services and cloud-based software solutions (e.g. EHR). This finding
applied to all participating practices, except for one that was fully “on paper” and did not utilize
IT as typically seen in today’s SHPOs.
This business decision is rooted in the organizations needing IT for business operations.
Outside of clinical operations most participant organizations outsource ancillary services
including payroll, legal, marketing, etc.
Outlined in Finding 3, the IT vendor has high importance and impact on the security of the
organization. Participants are not evaluating IT vendors for their security ability or ensuring
security is factored into contract language. Often times the relationship is based on a trusted
referral. Only one organization had elected to have a dedicated IT outsourced staff member
present on-site full time to provide timely access to an IT resource.

Theory
The “flashlight in a dark room theory” is based upon research findings, utilizing
grounded theory methods. The overarching theory shows organizations outsource IT operations
in a trusting and reliant relationship, confident their IT vendor is effective, partially due to their
own limited technology and security knowledge. Security is implicitly perceived as an IT
function and through transitive properties organizations establish confidence in the effectiveness
and appropriateness of their security implementation. This results in an organization’s perceived
cyber risk exposure not aligning with its actual exposure
Metaphorically speaking, organizations are using a flashlight in a dark room of cyber
risk. The space that is illuminated represents their understanding of what cyber risk is and the
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controls they have implemented to mitigate the risk, but this does not account for the cyber risk
that is not illuminated.

Figure 3 - Flashlight in a dark room theory

EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY

80

The theory is presented in a quasi-entity-relationship diagram (ERD). The entities and
relationships in the diagram refer to findings or thematic areas that emerged from the research.
The following explains in greater detail the entity and relationship elements in the diagram.
The IRP represents the research participant interviewed. Recall this research required the
interviewing of the individual that is responsible and accountable for information security at the
practice. This was always an individual that did not have formal IT training.
Limited IT and information security knowledge were a universal characteristic of the
IRP. This was self-proclaimed explicitly by some participants and implicitly by others. This
concept influences how the IRP understands the scope of security and the function of IT within
the context of an organization’s information security program.
IRPs consistently demonstrated a desire to be as secure as possible meaning their
organizational information security controls are sufficient to protect the organizations data assets
and to be compliant with HIPAA.
The limited related knowledge to the IRP supports the finding that IRP’s trust and rely on
IT vendors. This trust and reliance results in the IRP having confidence in their security
program’s effectiveness. This further supports the IRP’s confidence in their program because
they are actively engaged to ensure the organization is as secure as possible, which they perceive
as a truth. The IRP sees the scope of the IT vendor’s work to include security activities. This is
resultant from technical security controls being implemented by the IT vendor and being
interpreted by the IRP as the scope of required security controls to “be secure”.
IRP’s perception of what represents security for their organization is often perceived as
privacy controls and security controls that protect the confidentiality of patient information. This
is reinforced via prominent news stories of healthcare-related data breaches resulting in financial
penalties to healthcare organizations and experienced incidents of privacy breaches for IRPs.
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The scope of the IT vendors statement of work for participant organizations is perceived
to include security by the IRP. Furthermore, perception of security to the IRP is seen as controls
that mitigate risks that threaten confidentiality. Thus, security control selection implemented at
the organization is influenced to address breach of confidentiality and seen as an IT matter.
The security control selection, the narrow perception of what security means to the IRP,
the assumption of security being addressed by the IT vendor, and the confidence the IRP holds in
the SHPO’s security program explains the IRP’s perception of risk exposure being misaligned
with the organization’s real risk. This misalignment answers why SPHOs do not have very
effective information security controls despite internal and external factors.

Discussion
This research set out to understand why information security at SHPO is not very
effective despite internal and external factors promoting the opposite. This area of research is
limited, with very little literature looking at information security for these business types.
Therefore, it made logical sense to utilize a qualitative research methodology to explore this
space and understand the dimensions of the problem and develop a theory to explain what is
actually occurring to create this phenomenon.
The purpose of this section is to provide the researcher’s interpretation of the findings.
These interpretations are informed by the findings themselves, the complete interview experience
the researcher had with each participant, the researcher’s own world views and professional
experience, and the current literature.
Nearly all participants acknowledged their limited knowledge of IT. Finding 1 includes
both IT and information security as the limited knowledge area, but most participants were
unable to distinguish between the two topics with any level of accuracy.
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IRPs are responsible for several facets of the business operations including technology.
Kruse et al. (Kruse et al., 2017) show the healthcare industry struggles with new technology. The
voiced frustration by some participants indicated technology was a losing proposition to stay
knowledgeable on: “cyber changes and evolves so much faster than anything else that it’s
difficult to keep up with that” (PR7). IRPs want technology to support the organization's mission
and they “don’t want to be thinking about technology” (PR12). Implementing security is
inclusive this delegation. Therefore, they not need to be IT or information security
knowledgeable.
An interesting and unexpected observation was the increase of information security
knowledge for the participant simply from participating in this research study. Multiple
participants commented at the end of the interview on their level of attention they have given
toward information security at their organization and their heightened awareness to remedy that
going forward. This may result in increased cyber security activities. However, Johnson and
Koch’s (Johnson & Koch, 2006) survey-based research showed (industry-agnostic) small
businesses, will not take action to remediate information security risk if made aware of it.
An ancillary observation noted four research candidates that chose not to participate. This
is within their rights as candidates, but the manner in which they chose to not participate was
interesting. All four candidates engaged in positive communication regarding the research study
and their desire to participate. Two of the candidates, PR13 and PR15, ceased communication
altogether when it reached the stage of scheduling an interview. Two of the candidates, PR4 and
PR11, scheduled interviews with the PI, but did not show up for the interview. All four
participants never responded to any further communication from the PI which included two
communications regarding scheduling (PR13, PR15) and two communications regarding failure
to attend the agreed upon meeting time for the interview (PR4, PR11).
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The demographic of these four organizations are similar to the nine participants in this
study. Many other participants found speaking with the PI during the interview increased their
awareness of information security. There is not enough data and it was not the objective of this
research study to determine why these participants ceased communication and did not
participate.
The basis of participants knowledge of information security was the perceived
interpretation of HIPAA, real-life cyber incident experience, cyber incidents in the news, or
stories from colleagues. This knowledge was often related to a confidentiality compromise such
as stolen work papers from a car or snooping on a patient record without just cause. This
reinforced the findings of limited knowledge in the space and the emphasis and nearly singular
objective focus of security control selection to ensure confidentiality.
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) identify the three
factors of trustworthiness as ability, benevolence, and integrity. Participants were very trusting of
their IT vendors. The IT vendors had significant privileged access to the participants
organizational information assets and business operations, but not once did a participant mention
any concern about their IT vendor from an organizational risk perspective.
The limited knowledge participants have in IT and information security increases their
assigned value of ability of their IT vendor. Increasing the ability value therefore increases the
trustworthiness of the vendor to the participant.
Many participants related the quality and reliability of their IT vendor to the timeliness,
accessibility, and the stability of the organizations IT. When asked if information security was a
factor in selecting their IT vendor, PR6 said: “Well I mean just their experience with them being
timely being a good firm being up to date on current practices that are best practices all of these
are factors in our decision to choose them as our IT firm.” (PR6). Therefore, an IT vendor is
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reliable if they ensure the organizations computers are fixed in a timely manner if they break and
that they can be reached easily if needed. This is equated with IT vendor competence. Per Mayer
et al. (Mayer et al., 1995) work this IT competency establishes trustworthiness.
Information security implementation is being seen as an IT exclusive issue by the IRP,
despite the participants referencing non-IT related controls such as training and awareness for
staff on secure practices and policy development. When PR14 was asked what information
security responsibilities he had, his response was “We have a cyber person” (PR14), referring to
the organization’s IT vendor.
As previously discussed, limited knowledge of IRPs coupled with the assumption that IT
vendors are information security experts corroborates SPHOs view security is inherently
achieved through IT management, and the responsibility of the IT vendor. The two Venn
diagrams below illustrate perception and reality:

Figure 4 - Perception: Information security position within an organization
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Figure 5 - Reality: Information security position within an organization

Bagwell (Bagwell, 2016) showed small businesses are resource-constrained and do not
have the opportunity to dedicate resources to programmatic information security to protect their
data and assets, therefore IRPs may see the IT vendor providing information security as a costsavings and the ability to be proactive about security in the face of resource scarcity.
HIPAA is often discussed in the context of a privacy breach. HHS’ OCR maintains a
public website of all healthcare industry related privacy breaches over 500 records, a so-called
'wall of shame'. The concept of not sharing personal information with unauthorized individuals is
very easy to comprehend. Multiple participants cited related examples when discussing their
organizations own security controls. The following exchange highlights the unconscious
association with how security and security effectiveness is perceived:
Interviewer: For the security controls you guys do have in place how effective
would you say they are? (PI)
PR6: I hope I'm not jinxing myself, but I think they're very effective we haven't
had any type of breach or hack (PR6)
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This coupled with the IRPs limited information security knowledge to be aware of the
threat landscape suggests they see protecting the confidentiality of patient information as the
focus of the HIPAA and their own security program.
Many participants shared their organization had never had a security incident. This
indicates a conflict with Hoffman (2015) who published 90% of healthcare providers have
suffered a data breach between 2012-2014. This conflict may be in the way participants viewed
security incidents. One exchange highlighted this as PR8 shared his organization has never had a
breach, but then quickly qualified it:
Interviewer: How effective do you think your security controls are? (PI)
PR8: I think they’re 100% effective. (PR8)
Interviewer: Okay. (PI)
PR8: Never had a breach. (PR8)
Interviewer: Okay. (PI)
PR8: Never had a breach—a reported breach. (PR8)
Participant organizations are willing to invest in security and introduce controls to be
compliant or “do whatever it takes to make sure we're secure” (PR6). Multiple participants noted
cost was a factor in making information security decisions but would be willing to spend what it
takes to be reasonably secure. Highlighted by the “flashlight in a dark room” metaphor, the areas
of risk and the threats the participants are aware of have controls implemented to mitigate the
risk to perceived acceptable levels. Finding 1 that pointed out that limited knowledge of IT and
information security misleads IRP’s confidence in their program because for the limited
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knowledge of risks and controls they are aware of; the IRP’s are addressing them. This suggests
how they have confidence in their security posture.
A recurring concept heard from multiple participants was the need to outsource IT
because of its criticality to the business and the ability for it to be wholly delegated. Participants
ranged from business managers, practice administrators, C-level personnel, and managing
directors. All participants had responsibilities to their organization that included a diverse range.
One participant shared “I handle a lot of different areas it’s hard to be an expert in every single
area” (PR7).
An overwhelming majority of participants (7/9 or 78%) were not implementing a riskbased security assessment to inform what controls they should be implementing and the risk
reduction value. Technical controls appeared selected based solely on IT vendor
recommendation.
Two of the participants had transcended from this risk exposure reality and perception
misalignment through execution of a security risk assessment activity. This activity informs on
risks to the SHPO from relevant threats and security controls to reduce those risks. This activity
affects the participants limited IT and information security knowledge and resulted in the
implementation of a risk-based security program that is continually monitored and evaluated.

Conclusion
SHPO are interested in being secure and protecting patient information appropriately.
The foundational issue with these organizations’ approach to information security is the coupling
of two issues. First the narrow scope the IRP’s identify as the composition of information
security. Secondly the SHPO’s assumption of outsourcing information security by outsourcing of
IT services.
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The “flashlight in a dark room” theory was presented to metaphorically explain the
phenomenon. Six key findings were presented that were inductively discovered through
grounded theory techniques and theoretically saturated from research participants.
A discussion of the findings and their potential implications was provided to help shape
the impact and results of these findings.
The following chapter provides the conclusion to the research dissertation. Each finding
and the theory itself have warranted conclusions that are logical and clearly explained. Doable
and actionable recommendations for SHPOs are provided to address the discovered barriers.
Limitations to the research study are provided. Finally, recommendations for future research are
suggested.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
This research effort has explored information security practices of small healthcare
practices. This area of research is very limited, and this study’s intent was to qualitatively
understand how information security is perceived and approached through the experiences of the
responsible individuals operating in this space. Intensive interviewing techniques, informing a
grounded theory methodology, fostered the development of a theory explaining how information
security is implemented, operated and maintained at these organizations.
This chapter presents conclusions based on the findings and analysis presented in Chapter
4. Recommendations for both policy development and practical actions for these organizations
are provided. Several areas of future research are suggested. Limitations to the research are
presented to assist in validity and bounding the theory. Finally, given this research was an
eighteen-month effort, researcher reflections on the study and its findings are presented.

Conclusions
Responsibility for a function with limited knowledge. The first finding of this research
is the limited knowledge in IT and information security that the responsible individual in the
practices possesses. These individuals’ knowledge base is primarily clinical and business
operations.
SHPOs should expect IRPs to become knowledgeable in IT and information security, at
minimum from an awareness perspective. Assigning responsibility of a business area to an
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individual with no knowledge in the area is risky; businesses might not choose to do this if they
knew the scope of information security and associated risks. Meanwhile, the IRPs acknowledged
their limited knowledge, but were generally uninterested in learning more about information
security.
Nevertheless, IRPs must increase their knowledge of IT and information security to better
inform the organization across all facets of the information security space. Increasing knowledge
expands the concept of security objectives, affects security control selection, and allows the IRP
to properly understand the role their IT vendor is providing from an information security
perspective and where gaps exist.
IT expertise and information security expertise are not equivalent. The second
finding is that SHPOs trust and rely on their IT vendors to have IT knowledge and expertise, and
because IRPs associate information security with IT, they assume IT vendors are information
security experts.
Many security controls are associated with architecting and configuring IT in a secure
manner. This may suggest why IRPs mistakenly assume IT vendors provide for the information
security needs of their organization.
IRP's should expect IT vendors to be knowledgeable on IT with respect to functionality
that provides some information security capabilities, but should not assume the IT vendors are
otherwise information security knowledgeable. For example, an IT vendor should know how to
configure a firewall (a network device for controlling data flow into and out of an organizations
IT infrastructure), but it must not be assumed the vendor knows how to configure a firewall
securely.
Perceptions that IT vendor contracts cover information security. The third finding is
that SHPOs assume IT vendors provide comprehensive information security as part of their
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service offering. IT vendors will unavoidably be engaged in implementation of some security
controls for an organization, such as configuring computers to require a username and password
for login. This does not mean the security controls are comprehensive, appropriate, or even
adding significant risk-reducing value.
IRPs should view information security and IT as separate business aspects. Information
security should help inform IT on how to configure security features in technology and to what
extent of security to implement. Information security does have entanglements with IT but is not
exclusively IT.
Understanding the scope of information security. The fourth finding is the concept
that IRPs are thinking of information security with the lens of only one security objective confidentiality, in compliance with the HIPAA privacy-related regulation.
IRP's must not view information security as a privacy activity. They must understand
that the scope of information security includes availability, integrity and confidentiality
objectives as reported by Whitman and Mattord (Whitman & Mattord, 2011). Expanding
awareness will inform the IRPs about what threats and risks exist and what controls can be
implemented to address them.
Desire to implement appropriate security. The fifth finding is the confidence in the
effectiveness of participants currently constituted information security programs, and their drive
to invest and add controls to reduce any identified risk to acceptable levels. Therefore, the key is
to identify the very real risks.
IRPs may be willing to secure their organization if they were aware of evident threats and
risks. Indeed, even a brief phone interview about information security, or discussions within
professional organizations, might be the catalyst for a deeper threat assessment. Such an activity
would metaphorically be "turning on the light switch" in the dark room of risk the IRP is looking
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at with a flashlight. This conclusion does conflict with Johnson and Koch’s (2006) research that
suggests if a small business owner knows about a security risk, they are not willing to take action
to defend or pay for protection; however, their research was for home-based small businesses
and was not focused on healthcare operations.
Outsourcing services will continue. Finally, the sixth finding is the consistency with
which SHPOs outsource IT and nominally information security. In fact, they are generally not
really outsourcing information security, but believe they are through the IT vendor outsourcing
services.
SHPOs should identify that IT and information security are separate business aspects and
outsource appropriately. Some IT vendors do provide in-depth information security services as
an additional service, but SHPOs must understand when this is additional, and be certain that
contract language is clear and meets the SHPO’s information security needs.
Regardless of any outsourcing of information security services, SHPOs must ensure they
address information security as a critical business function, that includes certain elements (e.g.
operational controls) that must be practice-implemented and enforced. Otherwise, IT operations
will continue to have potentially significant, unaccounted, and implicitly-accepted risk.

Recommendations
The following recommendations are based on the findings, analysis and conclusions
presented in this dissertation. They are presented for two perspectives: policy and practice.
Policy is to inform the industry and legislators on making macro changes that may improve the
information security effectiveness for SHPOs. Practice recommendations are intended for
SHPOs to implement to align risk perception and reality, thus allowing them to have visibility
into their organization’s information security risk profile.

EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY

93

Policy. Education materials related to implementing appropriate information security at
small healthcare practices and designed for audiences with limited IT and information security
knowledge should be developed to effectively communicate ways to implement information
security. Efforts in early 2019 are already being seen to implement this recommendation. Chua et
al. (Chua, 2018) through the Healthcare & Public Health Sector Coordinating Councils produced
the "Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices: Managing Threats and Protecting Patients" report
that provides more accessible language and guidance from previous healthcare industry
information security guidance.
Currently the HHS’ OCR is tasked with ensuring compliance with both the HIPAA
privacy and security rules. This Office audits for compliance and has levied severe monetary
penalties (HHS.gov, 2018c). OCR’s guidelines for small healthcare practices are vague in this
researcher’s opinion; OCR should provide clear expectations for compliance with the HIPAA
security rule for SHPOs.
Currently OCR has two events that initiate an audit of a SHPO (HHS.gov, 2017a). One is
a submission of a SHPO HIPAA non-compliance event to HHS’ OCR. The other is a proactive
audit conducted by the OCR. The most recent phased activity audit occurred in 2016 and audited
less than eight-tenths of 1 percent of healthcare providers in the United States. Reference
Appendix E for details on how this value was determined. This indicates that SHPOs that are not
involved in a submission and are not involved in the OCR audit have no event that would initiate
a review of security control selection with respect to HIPAA requirements. HHS could
investigate policy to require healthcare providers to annually submit attestations of foundational
security control implementation through a standardized method. This same approach of reporting
is implemented for federal agencies annually reporting on Federal Information Security
Management Act (FISMA) compliance, a security and privacy standard comparable to HIPAA,
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to the Office of Management and Budget as required by law (Congress.gov, 2014). This would
provide HHS with data points to support rapid audits in the future and provide SHPOs with
awareness to the scope of information security controls to consider at their organization, thus
addressing the limited IT and information knowledge finding.
Practice. SHPO should seek explicit information security outsourced services to ensure
appropriate information security is implemented at the organization, thus assessing actual
organizational cyber risk.
A risk-based security program should be adopted to promote purposeful, value-add
security control selection for organizations. This will also allow organizations to be aware of
their current risks, prioritize risk remediation, and mature their information security program.
This recommendation is further supported by an initial observation from 2/9 of the SHPOs in the
research study. These two organizations had implemented a risk-based security program and
were informed by this approach on the larger scope of information security needs at their
organization.
Healthcare organizations should engage their medical malpractice insurance carriers to
determine the availably of cyber insurance riders. Two participants mentioned their malpractice
provider offered this, but had not added it to their policy.

Limitations
Chapman, Hadfield, and Chapman (Chapman, Hadfield, & Chapman, 2015) point out a
demographic-related limitation with qualitative research that applies in this study. The
demographic for the research population was constrained to SHPOs with fewer than ten
providers in the state of South Carolina, and may not apply to larger practices, or those in other
regions or states. In addition, the urban/rural distribution of this research sample may not be
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otherwise applicable. Five participating SHPOs were from the Charleston, SC area. While the
specialties of participating SHPOs were diverse (dermatology, pain management, neurology and
general practice), many other specialties were not represented; this is also a constraint of the
population demographic. Finally, all participating SHPOs were medical/surgical practices. This
excluded other healthcare provider types, including but not limited to psychotherapy, dental,
alternative, and tribal.
Sikolia et al. (Sikolia et al., 2013) identifies three techniques to promote interpretive
validity of qualitative research. These are participants reviewing and verifying the transcriptions
of their interview, participants guiding the direction of the interview, and using participants
language and responses in the emerging theory. Research participants limited their ability to
commit to participation outside the interview activity. Therefore, participant verification of
transcriptions was impossible, a potential research limitation.
The IRB prohibited in-person interviews. All IRPs were interviewed over the phone
(audio only, recorded). This prevented any ability to record and analyze physical or non-audio
behavior. Such observations are elemental to Maxwell’s (Maxwell, 1992) descriptive validity,
and their recording and analysis were part of this study’s original methods, but could not be
done.
Per Price and Murnan (Price & Murnan, 2004), another threat to the internal validity of a
study occurs when respondents do not respond truthfully to items on an instrument. However,
efforts were taken to encourage participant truthfulness in this research, as documented in
chapter 3. Indeed, this researcher believes that the research participants were honest and truthful
in their interviews; their responses were certainly “internally consistent.” Moreover, it may be
that the four “drop-out” IRPs did so because they were troubled about the “truths” they would
otherwise share about their SHPO. In any case, this must be included as a potential limitation of
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the study, that might be mitigated in future research by some external validation of IRP
responses.
Another limitation was the participant population size. Nine participant organizations
were included in this study. Creswell (2014) suggests 20 participants for a grounded theory study
and Charmaz (2006) suggests 25. Charmaz does state in an interview that Glaser, one of the
originators of grounded theory, suggested grounded theory could be done with as little as 3
interviews (Gibbs, 2015). This limitation was addressed by adhering to grounded theory methods
to achieve theoretical saturation for the developed theory.

Future Research
This research study was exploratory to help cast a light on a specific area of study with
minimal literature. Although it was able to answer the question of why SHPOs struggle with
information security. The following future research ideas will help inform on this theory’s
applicability, investigate practices that may address the issues this study introduces, and provide
inputs to policy makers.
IT vendor information security knowledge and implemented security controls. There
were some identified technical security controls implemented by IT vendors at the SHPOs.
Research focused on the knowledge of and actual security controls implemented by the IT
vendors could reveal the areas of risk that are commonly addressed by these organizations. This
could identify common explicit information security gaps at the SHPOs.
Same study, different state(s). This study was constrained to the state of South Carolina.
State specific regulations did not have material effect on the research participants. Participants
referenced federal regulations and did not mention state regulations when discussing information
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security regulations affecting their decisions and businesses. These findings may or may not be
generalizable to the small healthcare practices in all states.
Same state, controlled demographics. This study did not discriminate on demographics
for the participant organizations. Healthcare providers in rural, suburban, and urban areas may
have different priorities, information security attitudes, or resources. Introducing a constraint on
the participant demographic may lead to insights into subtle differences or needs for specific
healthcare organization types. This can inform policy makers and information security
responsible individuals to design and execute tailored reform.
Measure the degree of limited knowledge in IT/ information security. The finding of
limited IT and information security knowledge for IRPs was a material finding that underpinned
the overall theory. There was no investigation or analysis of the level of their knowledge. A
validated instrument to measure the level of knowledge for these IRPs in IT and information
security would be appropriate to better understand what “limited” means in this context.
Evaluate IT vendor contracts to assess security language. Another finding of this
research was the assumption IRPs make about the scope of work their IT vendors are responsible
for executing. The inclusion of information security in this responsibility was sometimes
mentioned in the contract, per the participants. An evaluation of contract language of IT vendors
that provide IT services to healthcare providers to determine if information security is included,
and to what degree.

Researcher reflections
Education is for improving the lives of others and for leaving your community and world better
than what you found it.
-Marian Wright Edelman, The Measure of Our Success, 1992
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This doctoral program was entered with the intention of making an information security
related contribution to small businesses. These business types are often marginalized when it
comes to research, best practices, and resources compared to their enterprise-sized counterparts. I
had no idea when I started this journey the direction it would take. Focusing on healthcare is
satisfying because it is an industry that lags among others for information security practices, has
a complicated struggle between timely information for clinical decisions and availability,
integrity and confidentiality considerations.
Many of the assumptions made at the onset of this research were proven wrong. I am
optimistic that the general attitude and passion the participants I spoke with implies that once
they ‘turn on the light’ they will improve their organizations overall information security. While
an optimistic notion, perhaps even brief IRP interviews about their practice’s information
security could be the spark that could start a fire of improving small business healthcare
information security in a meaningful way.
I was pleasantly surprised with the interest that participants had in speaking with me
about information security at their practice. I found them rather forthcoming. Moreover, it
appeared that the interviews led to their increased perception of value in knowing more about
information security. Indeed, despite their “status quo” outsourcing of information security to
their IT vendors, many participants expressed interest in reading this dissertation upon
publication to gain further understanding of how information security is being addressed in their
demographics.
I hope this effort serves this community and provides a foundation for future research to
be performed given this research’s exploratory nature.
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS
The following terms are used throughout this report. Their definitions are provided and
sourced. Appropriate definitions have been selected from healthcare and cybersecurity literature
and regulations to align to the research and literature contained within this document.

Breach
(A) IN GENERAL. The term ‘breach’ means the unauthorized acquisition, access, use, or
disclosure of protected health information which compromises the security or privacy of such
information, except where an unauthorized person to whom such information is disclosed would
not reasonably have been able to retain such information.
(B) EXCEPTIONS. The term ‘breach’ does not include—
(i) Any unintentional acquisition, access, or use of protected health information by an employee
or individual acting under the authority of a covered entity or business associate if—
(1) Such acquisition, access, or use was made in good faith and within the course and scope of
the employment or other professional relationship of such employee or individual, respectively,
with the covered entity or business associate; and
(2) Such information is not further acquired, accessed, used, or disclosed by any person;
(ii) Any inadvertent disclosure from an individual who is otherwise authorized to access
protected health information at a facility operated by a covered entity or business associate to
another similarly situated individual at same facility; and
(iii) Any such information received as a result of such disclosure is not further acquired,
accessed, used, or disclosed without authorization by any person. ("HITECH Act," 2009)
Business Associate
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Business associate: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (4) of this definition, business
associate means, with respect to a covered entity, a person who: (i) On behalf of such covered
entity or of an organized health care arrangement (as defined in this section) in which the
covered entity participates, but other than in the capacity of a member of the workforce of such
covered entity or arrangement, creates, receives, maintains, or transmits protected health
information for a function or activity regulated by this subchapter, including claims processing or
administration, data analysis, processing or administration, utilization review, quality assurance,
patient safety activities listed at 42 CFR 3.20, billing, benefit management, practice
management, and repricing; or (ii) Provides, other than in the capacity of a member of the
workforce of such covered entity, legal, actuarial, accounting, consulting, data aggregation (as
defined in §164.501 of this subchapter), management, administrative, accreditation, or financial
services to or for such covered entity, or to or for an organized health care arrangement in which
the covered entity participates, where the provision of the service involves the disclosure of
protected health information from such covered entity or arrangement, or from another business
associate of such covered entity or arrangement, to the person. ("Section 160.103. Definitions,"
2013)
Covered Entity
Covered entity means: (1) A health plan. (2) A health care clearinghouse. (3) A health
care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a
transaction covered by this subchapter. ("Section 160.103. Definitions," 2013)
Disclosure
The release, transfer, provision of access to, or divulging in any manner of information
outside the entity holding the information.("Section 160.103. Definitions," 2013)
Electronic Health Record
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The term ‘‘electronic health record’’ means an electronic record of health-related
information on an individual that is created, gathered, managed, and consulted by authorized
health care clinicians and staff. ("HITECH Act," 2009)
Healthcare Operations
Health care operations means any of the following activities of the covered entity to the
extent that the activities are related to covered functions: (1) Conducting quality assessment and
improvement activities, including outcomes evaluation and development of clinical guidelines,
provided that the obtaining of generalizable knowledge is not the primary purpose of any studies
resulting from such activities; population-based activities relating to improving health or
reducing health care costs, protocol development, case management and care coordination,
contacting of health care providers and patients with information about treatment alternatives;
and related functions that do not include treatment; (2) Reviewing the competence or
qualifications of health care professionals, evaluating practitioner and provider performance,
health plan performance, conducting training programs in which students, trainees, or
practitioners in areas of health care learn under supervision to practice or improve their skills as
health care providers, training of non-health care professionals, accreditation, certification,
licensing, or credentialing activities; (3) Underwriting, premium rating, and other activities
relating to the creation, renewal or replacement of a contract of health insurance or health
benefits, and ceding, securing, or placing a contract for reinsurance of risk relating to claims for
health care (including stop-loss insurance and excess of loss insurance), provided that the
requirements of §164.514(g) are met, if applicable; (4) Conducting or arranging for medical
review, legal services, and auditing functions, including fraud and abuse detection and
compliance programs; (5) Business planning and development, such as conducting costmanagement and planning-related analyses related to managing and operating the entity,
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including formulary development and administration, development or improvement of methods
of payment or coverage policies; and (6) Business management and general administrative
activities of the entity, including, but not limited to: (i) Management activities relating to
implementation of and compliance with the requirements of this subchapter; (ii) Customer
service, including the provision of data analyses for policy holders, plan sponsors, or other
customers, provided that protected health information is not disclosed to such policy holder, plan
sponsor, or customer. (iii) Resolution of internal grievances; (iv) The sale, transfer, merger, or
consolidation of all or part of the covered entity with another covered entity, or an entity that
following such activity will become a covered entity and due diligence related to such activity;
and (v) Consistent with the applicable requirements of §164.514, creating deidentified health
information or a limited data set, and fundraising for the benefit of the covered entity.("45 CFR §
164.501 - Definitions.," 2004)
Protected Health Information
Individually identifiable health information: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of
this definition, that is: (i) Transmitted by electronic media; (ii) Maintained in electronic media;
or (iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium. (2) Protected health information
excludes individually identifiable health information: (i) In education records covered by the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g; (ii) In records
described at 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); (iii) In employment records held by a covered entity
in its role as employer; (iv) Regarding a person who has been deceased for more than 50 years.
("HITECH Act," 2009)
Individually identifiable health information
Individually identifiable health information is information that is a subset of health
information, including demographic information collected from an individual, and: (1) Is created
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or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or health care clearinghouse; and (2)
Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the
provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision
of health care to an individual; and (i) That identifies the individual; or (ii) With respect to which
there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the individual.
("HITECH Act," 2009)
Security or Security Measures
All of the administrative, physical, and technical safeguards in an information system. ("§
164.304 Definitions.," 2011)
Health care Provider
The term ‘health care provider’ includes a hospital, skilled nursing facility, nursing
facility, home health entity or other long term care facility, health care clinic, community mental
health center (as defined in section 1913(b)(1)), renal dialysis facility, blood center, ambulatory
surgical center described in section 1833(i) of the Social Security Act, emergency medical
services provider, Federally qualified health center, group practice, a pharmacist, a pharmacy, a
laboratory, a physician (as defined in section 1861(r) of the Social Security Act), a practitioner
(as described in section 1842(b)(18)(C) of the Social Security Act), a provider operated by, or
under contract with, the Indian Health Service or by an Indian tribe (as defined in the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act), tribal organization, or urban Indian
organization (as defined in section 4 of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act), a rural health
clinic, a covered entity under section 340B, an ambulatory surgical center described in section
1833(i) of the Social Security Act, a therapist (as defined in section 1848(k)(3)(B)(iii) of the
Social Security Act), and any other category of health care facility, entity, practitioner, or
clinician determined appropriate by the Secretary.("HITECH Act," 2009)
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Threat
Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational
operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets,
individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an information system via unauthorized
access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service. (Kissel,
2013)
Information Security
The protection of information and information systems from unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity,
and availability.(Kissel, 2013)
Incident
A violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use
policies, or standard security practices. (Kissel, 2013)
Vulnerability
Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or
implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source. (Kissel, 2013)
Cyber Attack
An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of cyberspace for the purpose of
disrupting, disabling, destroying, or maliciously controlling a computing
environment/infrastructure; or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing controlled
information. (Kissel, 2013)
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
This document provides guidance on the agenda used to facilitate interviews for research
associated with South Carolina, Small Healthcare Provider Organization Cybersecurity Program
Decision Processes. Structure of interview and nature of question is based on Charmaz 2006,
“Constructing Grounded Theory” (Charmaz, 2006). The following preamble is spoken by the
researcher to the participant prior to asking any questions.

Preamble
Each interview will begin with my preamble to introduce myself, establish purpose of the
interview and affirm confidentiality. The preamble is:
Thank you for your time and speaking with me. I am a doctoral candidate. I
currently work at the Medical University of South Carolina, researching small
business healthcare cybersecurity decision processes. I would like to talk in
generalities to get an understanding of the types of security issues you may
face. I do not want to know explicitly if your company has had a successful
breach or experienced a successful cyber-attack.
The information provided will remain strictly confidential and you will
not be identified by your answers. You and your company’s name will not be
disclosed in any way. Data will be compiled with no individual responses tied
to your name or any identifying information about you. I would like to record
this interview. All information disclosed during our conversation will be kept
in a secure location. You may choose not to answer any question. Do you have
any questions before we get started? Are you willing to participate?
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I will begin recording this interview session now.

Ice Breaker Questions
1. Please tell me about yourself and how long you have worked at [company]
2. How did you come to be involved in information security at [company]
3. Please describe the organization structure at [company].
4. Please describe your cyber security related responsibilities at [company].

Information Security Program Questions
1. Describe the process and procedures related to cyber security at [company]
2. Describe the culture or attitude relative to security and privacy?
3. What is the overall approach for cyber risk management?
4. Describe how decisions related to cyber security are made? For example, HIPAA
regulations come out or the decision to invest in some type of security related technology
(cyber insurance, anti-virus software, etc).
5. Can you describe your beliefs toward healthcare cybersecurity regulation?
6. Can you describe your thoughts on cyber security as a responsibility at [company]?
7. When working with vendors (i.e. cloud solutions), how does cyber security factor into the
discussion and evaluation?
8. Without detail of an actual experienced cyber related attack, How has any experienced
cyber security related events such as a virus-infected computer, a stolen laptop with
patient data, or faxing to a wrong number, affected change at [company]?
9. How has your information security budget been changing over the past couple of years?
10. Describe your primary concerns from a cyber security standpoint?
11. What do you see as the biggest cyber threats for companies like yours?
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12. How do you identify which threats are most important and prioritize accordingly?
13. How effective are your security controls? How do you know this?
14. Describe how end user experience factors into cybersecurity decisions?
15. What factor is most important in driving cybersecurity investment: cost reduction,
compliance obligations, perceived risk reduction, general process improvement, or
something else? Please elaborate.
16. Are you involved with information security related budgeting decisions? When
evaluating about information security spending decisions, describe the process for
making those decisions, including if evidence or metrics used in making cyber
investment decisions.
17. Describe your thoughts on the information you have and use in managing overall cyber
risk and prioritizing accordingly?
18. Describe your thoughts on how cybersecurity is supported and decided here?
19. Can you describe how cybersecurity and the decisions made about cybersecurity have
changed over time?
20. What outside organizations have helped you in making cybersecurity decisions?
a. How did they get involved with your organization (sought out, vendor sales, post
breach, insurance provider, conference)?

Ending Questions
1. What do you think are the most important ways to make cybersecurity decisions for small
healthcare businesses?
2. Is there anything else you think I should know to understand how cybersecurity is
managed and how decisions about it are made at your organization?
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3. Is there anything that you might not have thought about before that occurred to you
during this interview?
4. Is there anything you’d like to ask me?

Interview Probes to Clarify and Elicit More Information
1. Could you clarify what you meant about ____?
2. How does ____ relate to ___?
3. How often does ____happen?
4. Where?
5. When?
6. Who is involved?
7. Is that always the same situation or have you ever experienced it to be different?
8. Was that the unusual?
9. Was that exceptional?
10. That’s something I haven’t heard before, could you explain more about _______?
11. Do you know other people who may experience that from a different perspective?
12. How did you come to know this?
13. Please go on _________. I’d like to know more about that, please explain
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APPENDIX C: IRB APPROVAL
APPROVAL:
This is to certify that the research proposal Pro00079974 entitled:
South Carolina, Small Healthcare Provider Cybersecurity Program Decision Processing:
A Grounded Theory Study
and submitted by: Gerald Auger
Department: Medical University of South Carolina
For consideration has been reviewed by IRB-II - Medical University of South Carolina and
approved with respect to the study of human subjects as adequately protecting the rights and
welfare of the individuals involved, employing adequately methods of securing informed consent
from these individuals and not involving undue risk in the light of potential benefits to be derived
therefrom. Additionally, the Institutional Review Board for Human Research (IRB) recommends
approval of the investigator's request for Waiver of Signed Consent in accordance with 45 CFR
46.117(c)(1),(2) because the only record linking the subject and the research would be the
consent document and the principal risk would be potential harm resulting from a breach of
confidentiality and/or because the research presents no more than minimal risk and involves no
procedures for which written consent is normally required outside of the research context.. No
IRB member who has a conflicting interest was involved in the review or approval of this study,
except to provide information as requested by the IRB.
Original Approval Date: 7/19/2018
Approval Expiration: 7/18/2019
Type: Expedited
Chairman, IRB-II - Medical University of South Carolina
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Susan Sonne, PharmD*
Statement of Principal Investigator:
As previously signed and certified, I understand that approval of this research involving human
subjects is contingent upon my agreement:
1. To report to the Institutional Review Board for Human Research (IRB) any adverse events
or research related injuries which might occur in relation to the human research. I have
read and will comply with IRB reporting requirements for adverse events.
2. To submit in writing for prior IRB approval any alterations to the plan of human research.
3. To submit timely continuing review reports of this research as requested by the IRB.
4. To maintain copies of all pertinent information related to the research activities in this
project, including copies of informed consent agreements obtained from all participants.
5. To notify the IRB immediately upon the termination of this project, and/or the departure
of the principal investigator from this Institution and the project.
* Electronic Signature: This document has been electronically signed by the IRB Chairman

through the HSSC eIRB Submission System authorizing IRB approval for this study as described
in this letter.
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APPENDIX D: CODING AND CATEGORIES
Table 5 - Coding inventory
Index
Name
Trust IT vendor with
1
Security
Trust IT vendor with
2
Security (NOT)
3
Reliant on Vendor
Reliant on Vendor
4
(NOT)
above and beyond
5
HIPAA
accepting and
6
supportive of HIPAA
accepting certification
7
as secure
8
Access controls
adopting EMR relative
9
to compliance
adopting EMR relative
10
to financial
motivations
adopting technology
11
slowly
assessing end user
12
population as very
careful
assessing paper records
13
as low value asset
14
assuming no breach
availability as a
15
security objective in
practice
be as secure as
16
possible
belief that security
17
should be high quality
believes no security
18
incidents
believing business is
19
HIPAA compliant

121

EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY
Index
20
21
22
23

24

25

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

34

Name
breach of patient data
is the impact
budget increased by
cyber security
budget unaffected by
cyber security
cautious about
agreeing to
requirements for cyber
insurance
challenging to keep up
with protecting as
technology evolves
cloud solutions more
secure because
absensce of physical
threats
collaborating with IT
vendor on decisions
concern of HIPAA
violation
concern of ownership
of a breach
concerned with record
retention and disposal
concerning about
financial impacts
concerning about
threats that can stop
business
concerning about
threats that damage
reputation
confidence in
production technology
being secure
confidentiality as a
security objective in
practice
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Index

Name

35

conflicting priorities at
the business

36

constraining challenges
of small business

37

controls are reactive in
nature

38

coorelating restituion
from contract breach as
financial

39

cyber insurance
certainly worth it from
a cost benefit ratio

40
41
42
43
44
45

46
47
48

49
50

deferring and
accepting of vendor
security standards
discussing attempted
breaches
dont take cyber
security threats as
serious until you've
experienced it
educating end users
encrypting email
end user convenience
is a factor in security
decisions
end user convenience
is not a factor in
security decisions
enforcing security
program
equating moving to
EMR with information
security needs
equating size of staff
with necessity of
control scope
erring on caution when
complying with
HIPAA
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Index
51
52
53

Name
executing DR/BCP
scenarios
factoring cost of cyber
security decisions
factoring risk reduction
in cyber security
decisions

54

Fearing lack of control
for external threats

55

functionality over
securty

56

generational factors
into secure use of
technology

57

hackers as a threat

58

hardware as an asset
HIPAA scope seen as
privacy
holding staff
accountable for
compliance
I wouldn’t really be
looking at other
metrics or data, it
would just be is this
the right time to go
ahead and start
working on this
insurance policy.
identifies program
security as appropriate

59
60

61

62

63

64

implementing
improvements to
security based on
lessons learned
implementing security
to comply with
legislation
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Index
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Name
income to medical
practices has gone
down
insider threat
integrity as a security
objective.
interacting with IT for
break/fix mostly
IT and security vendor
IT budget explicit
contains security
IT budget implicit
contains security
key quote
knowing area of
weakness but not
addressing

74

lack of compliance
oversight leads to
responsbile person's
interpretation of whats
best practice

75

lack of security
compliance due to
change resistance

76

lack of security
compliance due to
understanding

77
78
79
80
81

82

low IT knowledge
maintaining current
systems
medications and
writing prescriptions as
an asset
meh HIPAA
money well spent
needing to have basic
awareness and
education on
regulations and good
understanding of
information sharing
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Index

Name

83

not considering vendor
security practices
during selection

84
85
86
87
88
89

90
91
92

93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

patient care is impact
patient quality of life is
the impact
patient trust impact
patients information as
an asset
practicing proactive
security
previous incidents
awareness have
impacted workflows
protecting from
environmental threats
with business
continuity
putting patients at risk
questioning the
effectiveness of
HIPAA due to lack of
enforcement
receiving regular
update reporting
reliant on experts
remote access security
designed and
implemented
reputation as an asset
review security
risk-based security
program
security as a
continuous process
security decision
making requires
competency
security decision
making requires tech
savvy person
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Index
102

103

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

112

113
114
115
116
117

Name
security is taken
seriously
security not a
consideration for
business until an issue
(Reactive)
security staff
information as an asset
security too hard to
keep up to date and be
an expert on
securty as a burden
seeing ransomware as
a threat
seeing security and
privacy as different
concepts
seeing security as IT
only
seeing size of practice
as a benefit to low
costing security (meh)
seeking complete
security
seeking security
expertise for program
maturity
self aware of security
knowledge gaps
self aware of security
program maturity level
sensitive information
destruction practice
small business has
small footprint of
patient information
staff have too much on
their plate for security
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Index
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

132

133
134
135
136

Name
staff information as an
asset
staying engaged with
security
strong passwords
technology needed to
be efficient and
competitive
texting PHI a concern
thinking of security as
privacy
too small a business
for more controls
too small a business to
be a target
transferring perceived
responsibility
trusting vendor
try to do what the best
practices are
validating security
controls work
vendor selection
through trusted referral
verifying vendor
security before
selection
view on cyber security
hasnt changed over
time because havent
seen anything
(reactive)
we stay on the cutting
edge of technology
wishing for
compliance oversight
workforce security
conscious
working directly with
IT company

128

EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY
Table 6 - Category inventory
Index
Category
1
ASSETS
Confidence in Security
2
Program
FINANCIAL
3
RELATED
Healthcare Cyber
4
Regulation
5
IMPACTS
Knowing but not
6
Doing
7
Negative Security
8
OUTLIER CODES
Privacy as the full
9
scope of Security
PROACTIVE
10
SECURITY
REACTIVE
SECURITY 11
Changing security
from lessons learned
REACTIVE
SECURITY - Seeing
12
no reason to change
current security
THREATS - External
13
threats
THREATS - Internal
14
threats
Vendor Trust - Blind
15
Trust
Vendor Trust - Explicit
16
Functionality,
Assumed Security
Vendor Trust 17
Reliance

129

EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY

APPENDIX E: CALCULATING HHS AUDIT SCOPE
Table 7- Calculating HHS OCR phase 2 audit scope
765,117
Number of physicians in the United States as of November
2017(Colleges, 2017)
57.8%

57.8% of physicians work in practices with 10 or fewer
physicians (Kane, 2017)

442,238

Total number of physicians in the United States that work
in a practice with fewer than 10 physicians.
Formula: (.578 * 765,115)

44,224

Assuming all practices with fewer than 10 physicians all
have 10 physicians, therefore the maximum number of
practices with 10 or fewer physicians (i.e. SHPOs).
Formula: (442,238 / 10)

1

Fewest number of practices for all physicians that are in
practices with more than 10 physicians.

350

Number of audited covered entities that were audited for
Phase 2 audit protocol per interview with HHS OCR
(McGee, 2014)

0.79%

The likelihood of being selected for an HHS OCR Phase 2
Audit Protocol.
Formula: (350/(44,224 + 1))
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APPENDIX F: DATA SUMMARY TABLE
Table 8 - Data summary crosswalk
Participant

3

Limited IT
Knowledge

Risk-based
program

no - think for us it is
having someone who
is a little bit more
tech savvy, who
knows more about
computers than just
logging on and
logging into a system
and using it; knowing
the background,
knowing how the
basics of a computer
system work, and
how VPN and how
your IP address can
be vulnerable and
how things can
happen. You need
someone who
understand that to be
able to make those
decisions

yes- "It is part
of the
conversation
with the IT
provider when
we go through
our reports
quarterly to
look at risk,
potential risk.
Or if
something was
not catching
spam or if it
was seeing
someone trying
to infiltrate our
system then we
would change
it. Our risk
percentage
would then go
up and we
would have to
look at new
options."

Security seen
as Privacy

no- other
assets "with
cyber security
it’s always
someone
hacking into
our EMR
system to get
patient
information,
hacking into
my bank
accounts"

Trust IT vendor
with Security

Reliant on
Vendor

yes- "So I work
directly with our
IT company who
handles our cyber
security as well"

yes- "I rely on my
IT company to
give me my
metrics and my
risk factor, and
that is what will
decide whether
I’m going to
change or upgrade
to a different
product or
security. It’s
going to all
depend on my risk
factors."

Risk Analysis
performed(s)

Confidence in Sec
Program

yes- "It is part
of the
conversation
with the IT
provider when
we go through
our reports
quarterly to
look at risk,
potential risk."

yes- " I mean, your
security should be
topnotch. You’re
handling patients’
information which
has not only their
social security
numbers but it has
medications"
"So as long as my
risk stays at a low
percentage—we’re
talking less than a
5% chance of being
hacked into or
someone getting
into our system"

Support for
HIPAA

Strong support
for being secure
/ compliant

yes-"o I think
it’s very
important not
only HIPAA—
I mean,
HIPAA’s also
important"

yes-"So as long
as my risk stays
at a low
percentage—
we’re talking
less than a 5%
chance of being
hacked into or
someone getting
into our
system—we
tend to leave
things the way
they are. "
"
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Participant

Limited IT
Knowledge

5

yes- I kind of put
that trust in there that
they were going to
follow through with
whatever the
standard for
information
technology and
security and just trust
that was there to start
with, for me
personally I don’t
know the specifics
and ins and outs that
would be done on a
technical level. So I
wasn’t really
interested in asking
those questions to
make comparisons,
for me it was more
about the product
itself.

Risk-based
program

no-

Security seen
as Privacy

Trust IT vendor
with Security

yes- " I think
we recognize
that the
patients
information
and security
of that is
obviously
very
important. So
we take some
steps to
minimize
potential, I
guess, misuse
of that
information or
accidently
letting that
information
get out to the
public."

yes- "Did they
seem legitimate
company, it
wasn’t something
a little bit shady
and I had
questions, so I
kind of put that
trust in there that
they were going
to follow through
with whatever the
standard for
information
technology and
security and just
trust that was
there to start
with, for me
personally I don’t
know the
specifics and ins
and outs that
would be done on
a technical level."

Reliant on
Vendor

Risk Analysis
performed(s)

yes- " I’m sort of
at the mercy how
well or how poor
they are going to
do their job"

no- seems on
cusp though
"they do offer
an additional
cyber security
policy which
I’ve talked to
them a little bit
about recently
but to get that
done I’ve
looked at the
requirements
which I need
we have to
make some
concrete
protocols and
have a few
more things
written down"
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Confidence in Sec
Program

Support for
HIPAA

Strong support
for being secure
/ compliant

yes- "I would say
they(sec controls)
are good, they have
been effective and
are currently
effective the way
we are using them
but certainly need
to be reviewed and
improved upon."

yes- "I think
HIPAA and
everything that
follows along
with that,
obviously it
plays a very
important role.
I think for the
most part
everything
seems to be
done obvious
with good
intention"

yes- "Really one
is it’s the right
decisions to
make assuming
you believe
personal health
information
should be
private and
protected well
that’s the right
decision"
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Participant

6

Limited IT
Knowledge

yes- Well with me
I'm the managing
partner of course just
working with our IT
firm that handles our
IT part of our
business and it's
mostly just working
with them to ensure
we are secure as we
can be and that
they're safeguarding
all of our
information, its not
too technical what I
do, I lean a good bit
on our IT firm to
make those decisions

Risk-based
program

Security seen
as Privacy

Trust IT vendor
with Security

Reliant on
Vendor

no-

noavailability
"The main we
one we had
this last time
we do use the
cloud for
backup we
also use
backup hard
drives too at
two different
locations or
when
hurricanes
come in
inclement
weather and
something
maybe
destroyed we
have the
capability of
taking those to
a secure
place"

yes- IT vendor;
"Again the IT
firm handles that
so I trust them"
"it's just a
working
relationship with
the IT firm
having
confidence in
them that they are
up-to-date on
current practices
and best
practices. So we
stay ahead of any
kind of security
risk"

yes- "the only
thing you can do
rely on the experts
the people who
who work in this
field"

Risk Analysis
performed(s)

no-

Confidence in Sec
Program

yes- always been
HIPAA compliant
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Support for
HIPAA

Strong support
for being secure
/ compliant

yes-

yes- "we always
have to be
compliant no
matter what"
"we have the
attitude we want
to be as secure
and as private as
we can"
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Participant

Limited IT
Knowledge

Risk-based
program

Security seen
as Privacy

Trust IT vendor
with Security

Reliant on
Vendor

Risk Analysis
performed(s)

Confidence in Sec
Program
no- "cyber gets
kicked to the side
unfortunately"

7

yes-" I rely a lot on
my IT vendor I have
a good relationship
and trust him to be
able to help me
understand. My
background is
certainly not in IT"

no-

yes- "for me
the cyber
security part
of it is so
interconnected
with
protecting
PHI and
complying
with HIPAA
and all that
stuff."

yes-"talking to
my IT person, he
doesn’t
understand the
billing part of it,
or a lot of the
HIPAA part of it,
but he does
understand the
cyber security
part"

yes-" I rely a lot
on my IT vendor I
have a good
relationship and
trust him to be
able to help me
understand. My
background is
certainly not in
IT"

no- does do
'mini-risk
assessments'
when making
decisions, but
not really
security risk
analysis.

"I think your
questions were
pretty thorough but
I guess just just
like the perspective
to you know at the
end of the day it all
kind of comes back
to budgeting and
the financial
resources too. I’m
lucky enough to
work in a
dermatology group
that has been very
successful but
there’s not a whole
lot of independent
practices left
particularly with
certain specialties.
Derm seems to be
excluded from
some of those
threats they don’t
have the resources
to just function as
they are much less
worry about things
like that if that
makes sense like
there are so many
practices that go
under because they
have some sort of
Medicare lawsuit
or they just can’t
pay their staff or
they are not able to
purchase an EHR
and participate in
that and they keep
getting the
reimbursement cut
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Support for
HIPAA

Strong support
for being secure
/ compliant

no- "Okay I
personally
don’t have a
problem with
that I think I
understand it
and I
understand
why and I
understand the
risk but I think
it goes back to
what I was
saying before
about how it
changes it
involves so
much it’s not
just IT it’s I
think IT in
general
information
security and all
that technology
it touches so
many different
areas it’s hard
to I guess keep
up with it wrap
my arms
around it it’s
not just it
affects HIPAA
it affects that ,
it affects my
financials, it
effects my
patients, it
affects the staff
there’s just a
lot of if that
changes a lot
and keeping
up"

no- "I’ll tell you
my doctors are
more worried
about
malpractice suits
then cyber
security all day
long you know
that’s been
ingrained in
their brain from
day one about
making
appropriate
clinical decision
and minimizing
your risk there
and avoiding a
malpractice
lawsuit from a
patient or
referring doctor
or anything else
they are worried
about that kind
of security and
financial
security not
necessarily the
cyber security
and I just think it
hasn’t been on
the forefront of
anybody’s brain
for a long time
in this industry"
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Participant

Limited IT
Knowledge

Risk-based
program

Security seen
as Privacy

Trust IT vendor
with Security

Reliant on
Vendor

Risk Analysis
performed(s)

Confidence in Sec
Program
and I think they’re
so worried about
all these other
things that there is
enough time or
resources or room
to worry about
cyber security until
all those other
foundational things
are stable. I think
it kind it goes back
to psychology class
I took a while ago
where are you
know you don’t
have a roof over
your head and food
to eat you’re not
really worried
about some of
those other things
until you are stable
yeah want you get
a roof over your
head and you have
enough to eat then
you can worry
about all these
other things and
I’m not saying that
cyber security is
smaller but in the
grand scheme of
things if you can’t
pay yourself and
your staff that’s a
bigger problem
then if information
is getting
compromised so I
think it is kind
have to work
through that in
order to and that
health care is so
tumultuous right
now and changing
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Support for
HIPAA

Strong support
for being secure
/ compliant
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Participant

Limited IT
Knowledge

Risk-based
program

Security seen
as Privacy

Trust IT vendor
with Security

Reliant on
Vendor

Risk Analysis
performed(s)

Confidence in Sec
Program
so much and it’s
getting harder and
harder to practice
independently that
they never get to a
point to worry
about cyber
security they either
collapse and fold
their practice or
they get bought out
buy a big system
that already has
that stuff in place
so they never get to
the point where
they can actively
think about it I
guess my role with
the derm office I’m
lucky to work in a
place that is stable
financially and
doesn’t have they
are starting to feel
some issues with
reimbursement but
they are stable
enough that I need
to worry about are
we going to make
payroll next time or
anything like that
that I can start to
think about those
things. that’s the
only other thing I’d
say about that is
that that’s the big
reason why it’s not
a priority is that
there are a lot of
other things I guess
more financially
related and
regulatory related
that they are
already behind the
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Support for
HIPAA

Strong support
for being secure
/ compliant
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Participant

Limited IT
Knowledge

Risk-based
program

Security seen
as Privacy

Trust IT vendor
with Security

Reliant on
Vendor

Risk Analysis
performed(s)

Confidence in Sec
Program
curve with
technology and
then they’re always
worried about these
other things hey
what’s the new law
that passes or a
new regulation, or
is everything else
we have to worry
about that cyber
security gets
kicked to the side
unfortunately."

137

Support for
HIPAA

Strong support
for being secure
/ compliant
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Participant

8

Limited IT
Knowledge

yes - I’m 65 years
old, or soon to be 65
within about three
months. I’m not
electronically very
savvy. When I was in
high school, people
that were taking
keyboarding weren’t
going to college, they
were going into some
other field. And
computer labs in the
colleges were just
one or two courses.
So it certainly would
have probably
slowed me down
considerably in
patient care trying to
learn all that.

Risk-based
program

Security seen
as Privacy

no-

yes- "I think
it’s something
we talk about
but we think
more about
clinical care
than we do
about security
because it’s
pretty
automatic. It’s
hard—one
chart, one
patient in a
private room.
And we’re
very—we are
very careful.
We don’t
mention any
names of
other people
that we see.
We’re very
careful about
that."
"I don’t know
if you call that
security or
not, but
inability to
access patient
records I think
that’s a type
of security
problem"
"~~Roper
should have a
better backup
system to
prevent loss of
availability; i
have paper
records that
are
susceptible to
fire and flood,

Trust IT vendor
with Security

no- doesn’t use
vendor or EMR

Reliant on
Vendor

Risk Analysis
performed(s)

no- doesn’t use
vendor or EMR

no-"I don’t—
guess what you
could call—we
have cyber
security. We
use strictly
paper records
and they are
kept very
confidential,
very secure,
locked in a set
of record locks
as well as
behind a
separate locked
office door, as
well as locked
behind a
general office
door every
day. "

Confidence in Sec
Program

yes- "I don’t—
guess what you
could call—we
have cyber
security. We use
strictly paper
records and they
are kept very
confidential, very
secure, locked in a
set of record locks
as well as behind a
separate locked
office door, as well
as locked behind a
general office door
every day. "
Interviewer: How
effective do you
think your security
controls are?
Interviewee: I think
they’re 100%
effective.
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Support for
HIPAA

Strong support
for being secure
/ compliant

no- "I think
HIPAA has
utility. It’s
minimal. It also
has some
drawbacks"
"I don’t think
HIPAA’s
necessarily a
bad thing"

no- "I don’t
think there’s a
whole lot of
value for a thief
or someone
who’s compiling
information to
break into three
locks and carry
out pounds and
pounds of paper
information. I
don’t think it’s
worth it to them!
"
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Participant

Limited IT
Knowledge

Risk-based
program

Security seen
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but its in
God's hands"
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EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY

Participant

9

Limited IT
Knowledge

Risk-based
program

Security seen
as Privacy

Trust IT vendor
with Security

yes- I’m not an IT
professional!

yes- "Well,
through those
annual health
or security
assessments we
identify certain
elements that
may/could use
some attention,
or new
equipment, or,
you know, say
there are some
inactive users
that, you know,
we haven’t
deactivated. So
we go through
just a full
assessment of
all of our
equipment and
try and assess
what is
susceptible and
shore that up. "
"I generally
rely on my IT
guy here that I
really trust. I
usually ask
him, if he
suggests a
particular
mitigation
strategy, to
give me a
couple of
vendors and
the pluses and
minuses of
both as well as
the cost of
each, and then
we move
forward based
on that
information"

no- "Well,
you know, we
have annual
training—
cyber security,
HIPAA,
OSHA, all of
that—through
our
compliance
program. We
have forced
password
rules, you
know, to
update
passwords.
We’ve
recently
wanted
employees to
use phrases
not, you know
the typical
passwords. So
we’re
instituting
that. All of the
employees are
told not to
share
passwords.
We have, you
know, a
handbook that
lists all of
those
requirements
for good
stewardship of
data, and new
employees are
oriented with
those policies
as well."
"all cyber
security,
especially,

no- "I observe
this gentleman
every day in his
interaction with
the employees.
You know, I
think when he
gives me updates
or things that he
identifies during
his time here they
generally have
been right on. I
keep up with, you
know—every
now and then I’ll
read newsletters
just enough to be
dangerous and
get scared with
the cyber security
and all of the
breaches that are
out there. And he
always—if I ask
him a question
about them he
can tell me what
really occurred
and why, you
know, we need to
be cognizant of it
and if we are
subject or
susceptible to any
of those attacks
that have been
successful.
You know, it’s
hard to put your
finger on it, but
sometimes you
can just talk to
somebody and
just realize that
they know what
they’re doing."

Reliant on
Vendor

Risk Analysis
performed(s)

yes- "I generally
rely on my IT guy
here that I really
trust. I usually ask
him, if he
suggests a
particular
mitigation
strategy, to give
me a couple of
vendors and the
pluses and
minuses of both
as well as the cost
of each, and then
we move forward
based on that
information."

yes- "through
those annual
health or
security
assessments
we identify
certain
elements that
may/could use
some attention,
or new
equipment, or,
you know, say
there are some
inactive users
that, you
know, we
haven’t
deactivated. So
we go through
just a full
assessment of
all of our
equipment and
try and assess
what is
susceptible and
shore that up.
So, you know,
we have those
discussions
with myself,
my deputy—
my
administrative
assistant—and
the head of the
IT security,
and then we
develop a
timeframe to—
you know, if
something is
obviously a red
threat level we
act on it
immediately."

Confidence in Sec
Program

yes- "our mission
states that, you
know, we’re going
to do everything
we can to secure
data."
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for being secure
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yes- "it’s very
important,
obviously. The
HIPAA rule
has been
around for
quite some
time and we
drill, drill, drill
how important
it is to secure
information
and how
privacy of our
patients’ health
conditions is
crucial. "

The HIPAA rule
has been around
for quite some
time and we
drill, drill, drill
how important it
is to secure
information and
how privacy of
our patients’
health conditions
is crucial. And
that’s not only in
personal
communications,
which is kind of
what we’ve
drilled down and
made sure that
people
understand, but
it’s also in your
technical
communications
and making our
employees
aware that, hey,
you know, don’t
walk away from
your screen. You
know, log off
when you leave.
You know, you
wouldn’t want,
if it was your
information, up
for people to
casually see.
You know, just
trying to put
yourself in the
mindset of the
patient, and just
an overall
culture of that.
yes- "And, you
know, we’ve had
people that have

EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY

Participant

Limited IT
Knowledge

Risk-based
program

Security seen
as Privacy
you know,
with
healthcare
many
breaches
occurring
throughout the
country with
large hospital
systems and,
you know,
ransomware
and various
things. We
just want to
do—we want
to be ahead of
the curve and
try and make
it as difficult
for someone
that might eye
our
organization
as possible to
affect us
negatively.
So, I mean,
it’s a little bit
of yes, the
internal
assessment
certainly, but
also, you
know, it’s just
looking at the
landscape of
cyber security
in society and
trying to beef
it up as best
we can for a
small
organization."

Trust IT vendor
with Security

Reliant on
Vendor

Risk Analysis
performed(s)

Confidence in Sec
Program
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HIPAA
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not taken that
directive as
serious as we
would like and
those people
have been
disciplined. We
have very little
tolerance for that
type of behavior
because, you
know, if your
patients can’t
trust you with
their sensitive
information
that’s a very big
hurdle to
overcome. So
it’s just
ingrained in our
culture from the
day that people
are oriented how
important it is to
be good
stewards of the
data that we
have."

EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY

Participant

10

Limited IT
Knowledge

no

Risk-based
program

Security seen
as Privacy

yes- "So the
way we do it is
we kind of set
up a system
where we have
different tasks
involved and
first you try
and adjust your
risks, which
includes the
vulnerability,
the threats, and
the risk itself.
So you want to
look at the
scope of the
analysis, your
data collection.
You identify
any potential
documents—
documented
potential
threats and
vulnerabilities.
You want to
assess the
current security
measures,
determine the
likelihood that
the threat may
occur,
determine the
level of the risk
itself, finalize
your
documentation,
and then plan
to periodically
review and
update your
risk
assessment. "

no- "So it’s
my job to
make sure that
access to the
IT is always
safeguarded.
So I’m the
one that keeps
control of the
keys to the
server room—
because right
now we have
a server
because we’ve
been serverbased for
fourteen years
but, as I
mentioned,
we’re going to
cloud-based.
We use an
external IT
company that
monitors
everything. I
monitor the
arm and
disarm reports
for the alarm
system to
make sure that
no one’s
coming in and
going out. I
monitor the
employees by
inactivating
them, you
know, the
minute that
they might
leave our
employ. I
monitor
difference
uses. I keep

"for the cyberrelated security

Trust IT vendor
with Security

no- "if there’s
new technologies
out there then
we’re going to fit
them into our
budget for
business
operations and
make sure that
you’re protecting
everything that
you need.
And you really
have to do a lot of
evaluation. You
have to reach out
to different
resources.
Certainly your IT
company should
be able to provide
you with a lot of
that."

Reliant on
Vendor

no- "if there’s
new technologies
out there then
we’re going to fit
them into our
budget for
business
operations and
make sure that
you’re protecting
everything that
you need.
And you really
have to do a lot of
evaluation. You
have to reach out
to different
resources.
Certainly your IT
company should
be able to provide
you with a lot of
that."

Risk Analysis
performed(s)
yes- "So the
way we do it is
we kind of set
up a system
where we have
different tasks
involved and
first you try
and adjust your
risks, which
includes the
vulnerability,
the threats, and
the risk itself.
So you want to
look at the
scope of the
analysis, your
data collection.
You identify
any potential
documents—
documented
potential
threats and
vulnerabilities.
You want to
assess the
current
security
measures,
determine the
likelihood that
the threat may
occur,
determine the
level of the
risk itself,
finalize your
documentation,
and then plan
to periodically
review and
update your
risk
assessment. "
" I also do the

Confidence in Sec
Program

yes- "I think the
hacker’s probably
our biggest threat. I
mean, I know that
our facility is
secure and I’m not
worried about that.
A hurricane is a
hurricane. They’re
unpredictable and
we certainly have
protocols in place."
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yes- "Nobody
comes by from
HIPAA. There
are no HIPAA
police. they’re
far
understaffed.
And the reason
why is because
people don’t
take cyber
security threats
as serious as
they should
until you’ve
experienced it,
and then once
you’ve
experienced it
or you’ve
really sat down
to consider—
do you know
how many
office
managers that
are out there
that don’t know
what a security
risk analysis is?
"

yes- "Nobody
comes by from
HIPAA. There
are no HIPAA
police. they’re
far understaffed.
And the reason
why is because
people don’t
take cyber
security threats
as serious as
they should until
you’ve
experienced it,
and then once
you’ve
experienced it or
you’ve really sat
down to
consider—do
you know how
many office
managers that
are out there that
don’t know what
a security risk
analysis is? "
"I went to a
doctor’s office
on a visit with a
family member
and I was, you
know, appalled
at how loosely
things were
operated"
"For us cyber
security was the
Number 1
element because
the functionality
of the current
EMR we use is
certainly not the
best. I mean, it’s
more incumbent.
It’s a little

EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY

Participant

Limited IT
Knowledge

Risk-based
program

Security seen
as Privacy

we do a
security risk
analysis every
year. We
evaluate the
environment.
We evaluate
the
demographics,
what threats
might be
proposed. Like
we live in the
South, so
there’s a great
threat of
hurricanes and
that kind of
stuff. So we
always have to
go to an
emergency
preparedness
plan in terms
of our
technology,
because we
rely solely on
technology. "

control and
lockdown on
most of the
external
websites. I
continuously
communicate
to staff
regarding, you
know,
different types
of spam and
what we don’t
want them to
open and if
they think
something’s
suspect how
we want it
handled. And
we educate
the staff
annually on
HIPAA
regulations. "

Trust IT vendor
with Security

Reliant on
Vendor

Risk Analysis
performed(s)
security risk
analysis for the
IT system on
an annual basis
and do all the
compliance
for, you know,
HIPAA and all
EMR
facilitation"

Confidence in Sec
Program
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harder, and we
know that there
are other
programs out
there that are
maybe more
user friendly, but
they don’t
provide the
protection and
privacy that the
EMR we use
does. So for us
we are more
concerned with
protecting the
integrity of the
data than we are
of end user use."
"You go through
a process of
what is
reasonable
within your
budget. And,
you know, you
do hear me refer
to the budget
because it can
get expensive.
But, you know,
it’s money well
spent if you’re
following what’s
required of you.
I mean, in our
industry your
data’s got to be
authenticated.
You’ve got to
know that
what’s being put
in there is
actually what
happened. So we
try and make
sure that our risk
analysis process
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is ongoing and
that we’re—you
know, if there’s
new
technologies out
there then we’re
going to fit them
into our budget
for business
operations and
make sure that
you’re
protecting
everything that
you need"

EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY

Participant

12

Limited IT
Knowledge

yes- I’m personally
not trained in
technology, so I
would literally have
to, you know, rely on
others’ suggestions
and then not just
jump on it right away
but do some research
of my own before we
just go ahead and
move forward with
something different
for our office, for our
practice here.

Risk-based
program

Security seen
as Privacy

Trust IT vendor
with Security

no-

yes- Well,
when it comes
to like for our
business,
yeah, I think
it’s important
that you keep
everybody’s
records safe,
you know.
Because you
think about it.
Not only the
medical
history is on
there. You
have people’s
social security
on there. You
have, you
know,
addresses and
phone
numbers
and—you
know,
definitely it’s
for the safety
of our
patients, you
know. and
that in my
eyes is the
priority. It’s
our first
priority is to
keep our
patients’
information
safe.
it’s amazing
to me because
I’m really not
very familiar
with all the
hyper, you
know,
technology

yes - No, I mean,
just overall, you
know, being in
this field it’s what
you hear, you
know, and how to
be, you know, on
the lookout and
protecting your
patients and stuff
like that. so, you
know, we had to
go with
somebody, and
then of course
you hear about
the
[REDACTED]
people.
but, you know,
other than that
it’s not like we
hear a lot about
cyber security,
you know. We
just know
personally that
we have to be
careful with our
patients’
information, you
know, so how
we’re going to
protect and now
what is the best
way to do it and
who do we trust,
who can we trust?
And of course
we, you know,
met with
[REDACTED]
and we heard
good things about
them and we
liked them and
we’ve had this
relationship with

Reliant on
Vendor

yes- I’m
personally not
trained in
technology, so I
would literally
have to, you
know, rely on
others’
suggestions and
then not just jump
on it right away
but do some
research of my
own before we
just go ahead and
move forward
with something
different for our
office, for our
practice here.
So that’s what I
worry about.
That’s my
responsibility here
in the office: to
make sure that
things run
smoothly within
the office. When
it comes to
technology and
cyber security I
have to—because
I’m not familiar
with it I have to
rely on companies
like
[REDACTED]and
[REDACTED]
that they’re doing
their job.
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no- a MIPS
based risk
analysis on the
EMR is
performed by
the EMR
hosting
provider for
the org as a
client. No risk
analysis on the
organization is
performed.

yes - Now, if the
computers are
running slow or if
we feel like
somebody hacked,
that’s when, you
know, we start
thinking about oh,
shoot, something’s
happening, you
know, we need to
get in touch with
our IT department
or, you know,
cyber, you know,
security and stuff
like that. But we
don’t really—it’s
not something that
we think about.
Now, maybe
because we’re
confident that we
are safe. Although
you can never be
too safe, I guess,
you know.

no - I’m not
saying it’s not
effective. I
mean, it’s
effective. It’s
been working
out. I mean,
from—again
I’ve been here
for a year. I
mean, it works
out. You know,
it’s okay. you
know, it’s what
is there now.
There’s always
going to be
adjustments. I
think it’s been
a great start of
it, I guess, I
don’t know.

yes-

EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY
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especially, as
much as it has
grown, that
we have to be
careful with,
you know. So
then of
course, you
know, you go
around and
you have to
do—I talk to
the staff here
and make sure
that they’re at
the same—
we’re all at
the same
level, you
know, with
confidentiality
when it comes
to, you know,
Google
searching to
patient
information to
sharing
information
and
everything
else.

them now for a
long time. So it
kind of fell in like
that.
Right. Yeah, so
anyway, so
there’s a lot of
things. So
that’s—you
know, when it
comes to cyber
security we rely
on [REDACTED]
and
[REDACTED].

Reliant on
Vendor

Risk Analysis
performed(s)

Confidence in Sec
Program
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EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY

Participant

14

Limited IT
Knowledge

yes - I defer a lot to
them because I’m not
an IT person, they
are, and I rely on
them to make sure
that everything is
secure.

Risk-based
program

no-

Security seen
as Privacy

yes- I mean,
we’re not a
corporation
where we’re
hiding any,
you know,
secret plans as
far as like
what we’ve
built or, you
know,
patented
information or
anything like
that. our
information
that’s very
private to us is
that of our
patients.

Trust IT vendor
with Security

yes- A lot of that
comes over again
from IT, you
know. And we’ve
been working
with the same IT
group for, gosh,
almost ten years
and go with their
recommendations
of what we need.
You know, and
then of course we
look at costs and
all of that and if
it’s over a certain
threshold we go
to our board of
directors, you
know, to sign off
on that purchase.

Reliant on
Vendor

yes- I defer a lot
to our IT
department. I
mean, like I said,
they monitor, they
make sure that
they check and
run for viruses or
breachments in
our system, which
we haven’t had
any. I defer a lot
to them because
I’m not an IT
person, they are,
and I rely on them
to make sure that
everything is
secure.

Risk Analysis
performed(s)

no- Okay. So
as a practice
there what’s
the overall
approach to
cyber risk
management?
interviewee:
The overall
approach—I
don’t know
exactly—
Interviewer:
How do you
guys manage
your cyber risk
there?
Interviewee:
Cyber
security—you
know, we have
downloaded
onto our
system, so
that’s checking
on a regular
daily basis.
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yes- I think maybe
after our
conversation with
you and you
helping to educate
me a little more I
could better answer
that question. But
as it stands now I
feel pretty secure.

no - Well, I
don’t have bad
thoughts about
regulations. I
think it’s
important. I
think it’s
necessary. You
know, I don’t
want my
information of
my children’s
information,
you know, out
there for
everyone to
access, so I
think it’s
important. I
think like
anything else I
think you can
go overboard
with
regulations and
some of it be
unnecessary
and cost money
and time that’s
unnecessary,
but at the same
time I think
what we have
in place right
now that’s
required of us
is sufficient.
I’m sure there’s
room for
improvement
in places for
that but it’s
important.

yes- Absolutely,
yes. And we
take it very
seriously. We
want to be able
to make sure
that, you know,
their identity is
kept
confidential,
they trust in
us.... So it’s
important to me
and my team
that we keep
everything in the
strictest of
confidence.

